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Abstract
Engagement in a costly and destructive war can be understood as the punishment
for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to
war make this punishment less severe. This may incentivize hawkish political choices
like militarization, and potentially o¤set the benets of peace-brokering institutions.
We analyze a simple model in which unmediated peace talks are e¤ective at improving
the chances of peace for a given distribution of military strength. But, once the e¤ects
on militarization are considered the presence of unmediated talks leads to a higher
incidence of war. Not all conict resolution institutions su¤er from this drawback. We
identify a form of third-party mediation, inspired by the work of Myerson, and show
that it can e¤ectively broker peace in disputes once they emerge, and also minimize
the level of equilibrium militarization.
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1 Introduction
A voluminous literatures seeks to understand which institutions e¤ectively resolve disputes
that might otherwise lead to military conict. The emergence of a dispute is usually taken
as the starting point of the analysis, so as to ask questions of the sort: given a dispute,
how will di¤erent institutions such as mediated or un-mediated peace talks likely inuence
the outcome?1 This paper broadens the scope of analysis. Instead of taking disputes as
given, we ask: how are disputes likely to emerge, given the playersexpectations about
the conict resolution institutions that will be adopted by the international community?
Intuitively, a costly and wasteful conict can be understood as the eventual punishmentfor
militarizing and entering a dispute in the rst place. Hence, institutions that minimize the
chances that disputes end in conict may breed militarization, and lead to the emergence
of more dangerous disputes. Evaluating this possibility is an important part of forming an
assessment of the overall value of conict-resolution institutions.2
This paper shows that the analysis of the connection between dispute resolution in-
stitutions and militarization incentives may challenge established views. Specically, we
provide a model of militarization and negotiation in which un-mediated peace talks are
e¤ective in reducing the chance of conict in ongoing disputes for any given distribution
of military strength, but create perverse equilibrium incentives for militarization and thus
alter the mix of disputes that emerge. This negative e¤ect is so strong in our framework,
that the resulting equilibrium total probability of warfare becomes higher than in the case
1Recent theoretical work analyzes the e¤ectiveness of peace talks and third-party mediation as conict
resolution institutions (e.g., Bester and Wärneryd 2006, Fey and Ramsay 2010, Hörner, Morelli, and
Squintani 2015, Kydd 2003). Others consider how various forms of direct diplomacy can inuence the
probability of conict (e.g., Baliga and Sjöström 2004, Ramsay 2011, Sartori 2002, Smith 1998). Bercovich
and Jackson (2001) and Wall and Lynn (1993) review the empirical literature on the e¤ectiveness of
mediation as a conict resolution institution.
2The possibility that well-meaning third party intervention may lead to perverse incentives for the emer-
gence of disputes is a concern of academics and practitioners alike. For example, Kuperman (2008) presents
evidence that expectations of humanitarian military intervention have emboldened weaker groups to trigger
conict against dominant entities (see also De Waal, 2012). Kydd and Straus (2010) provide a theoretical
model of this issue. Unlike us, they do not consider mediation and do not endogenize militarization choices
in their analysis.
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that un-mediated peace talks are not supported by the international community.
To see the intuition, take as the starting point of the analysis an ongoing dispute that
has already emerged and treat the playersmilitarization decisions as given. Signicant
resources are devoted to guarding their secrecy so that the players are uncertain about each
others strength.3 This uncertainty leads to wars; strong players who do not know their
opponentsstrength are willing to take their chances and ght. In our model informative
communication with un-mediated peace talks reduces the uncertainty and decreases the
chance that the dispute evolves into open warfare.4
Now take a step back and consider the whole strategic interaction including the players
secret militarization decisions. In equilibrium at the time of negotiations each player must
be uncertain of whether the opponent militarized or not. Were this not the case, the players
would know each others payo¤s in case of war, and would be able to nd a mutually
benecial agreement to avoid a destructive conict. But then, in anticipation of certainly
avoiding conict, each player would strictly prefer to not militarize, and this would disrupt
equilibrium.
As a consequence, un-mediated peace talks must increase the equilibrium probability
that each player militarizes, precisely because they reduce the chance of an eventual de-
structive conict among militarized players. If the probability that the opponent militarizes
did not increase, each playersexpected benet for arming would outweigh the expected
punishment. The player would strictly prefer to militarize, thus disrupting equilibrium.
Further, un-mediated peace talks need to increase the overall probability of conict in
equilibrium. This is because they increase the probability that a single player militarizes,
and cannot decrease the equilibrium probability that a militarized player ghts, when taking
3This description is hardly remarkable, given the extent to which States and other disputant entities
engage in espionage and counter-espionage, as well as manipulating beliefs about their actual military
strength. Among some famous episodes of manipulations, Soviets ew jets with fake missiles in parades,
and Serbians put cardboard tanks in their towns during NATO-led air strikes. Likewise, the prospects of
the Star Wars program sponsored by the Reagan administration were grossly exaggerated.
4This result was rst proved formally by Baliga and Sjöström (2004). As we explain later, our analy-
sis complements their ndings: we identify reasons di¤erent from the ones they singled out, for which
communication reduces the chance of conict in ongoing disputes.
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into account the increased probability that the opponent also militarized.5 This last point
holds because if the probability that a militarized player ghts were to decrease then the
expected benet for militarization would outweigh the expected punishment, and again
equilibrium would be disrupted.
Given this insight, it is natural to ask whether all conict resolution institutions su¤er
from these same drawbacks. We nd that this is not the case, in our model. We identify a
type of third-party intermediation inspired by the work of Myerson (1979, 1982), and called
Myerson mediationhere, that improves the chances of peace-brokering in ongoing disputes
more e¤ectively than un-mediated peace talks, and also reduces equilibrium militarization.
Importantly, this is despite the fact that the mediators mandate cannot realistically in-
clude the objective of preventing militarization; the playersmilitarization decisions have
already taken place when the mediator is called in to deal with the ongoing dispute and so
controlling this incentive must be viewed as beyond her mandate or concern.
This form of mediation is conducted by third parties who do not have access to privileged
information, nor to the military or nancial capability to enforce peaceful settlements.
Hence, the mediators role is to facilitate negotiations by managing the ow of information
among the players. This is achieved by setting the agenda of the peace talks, and by steering
their proceedings, to collect and judiciously communicate select condential material
(Rai¤a, 1982, pp. 108109). In the taxonomy of Fisher (1995), Myerson mediation is a
form of pure mediation, whereas it is closer to procedural mediationin the terminology
by Bercovich (1997). A review of the literature nds evidence that this form of mediation
is often employed.6
5This is despite the fact that un-mediated peace talks decrease the probability of conict in pairs of
militarized players.
6Scholars in international relations have identied two main types of mediation: communication facili-
tation mediation, and procedural mediation. The latter is the closest to this papers model, because players
pre-commit to let the mediator set the procedure and steer the dispute resolution process. In practice,
this impedes their capability to negotiate, or renegotiate an agreement outside the mediation process. Pro-
cedural mediation is widely adopted as it is perceived to be the most e¤ective form of mediation. Since
World War I, over 30 territorial disputes have been brought to an international adjudication body (Huth
and Allee 2006) which took the form of procedural mediation. Among all other cases in which mediation
3
As well as comparing the e¤ectiveness of mediated and un-mediated peace talks, we
provide a broader result on Myerson mediation within our framework. Optimal mediation
strategies, while designed to only give the highest chance of peace in ongoing disputes, also
provide the best possible incentives against militarization within the class of institutions
that do not give intermediaries access to privileged information or a budget to make trans-
fers to players. Put more succinctly, in our model the narrow mandate of these mediators
does not entail any welfare loss.
The reasoning behind our results on mediation is more complex than the intuition be-
hind the drawbacks of un-mediated peace talks. The rst step in our argument is the
application of the revelation principle by Myerson (1982). An optimal way for the media-
tor to organize and steer the peace talks is that, rst, the players report their information
independently to the mediator, and then the mediator submits a settlement proposal to
the players for their approval. In practice, this could be achieved in a two step process.
First, the mediator holds private and separate caucuses with the players. Then, she holds
a joint summit in which settlements are proposed to the disputants.7 The revelation prin-
ciple ensures that there is an equilibrium that maximizes the chance of peace in which
in anticipation of the mediators settlement proposal strategies the players reveal all their
private information to the mediator.
The second step in our evaluation of Myerson mediation involves characterization of
the optimal settlement proposal strategies that will induce the players to reveal their infor-
mation to her. Because militarized players are more likely to win wars they must receive
was involved (roughly fty percent of cases according to Wilkenfeld et al. 2005), many can be coded as
procedural mediation. Also, 427 disputes have been brought up for arbitrationwithin the World Trade
Organization between 1995 and 2011 (WTO database). This form of arbitration shares similarities with
procedural mediation, because the enforcement is based on the actions of individual WTO member States.
7This practice of shuttle diplomacyhas become popular since Henry Kissingers e¤orts in the Middle
East in the early 1970s and the Camp David negotiations mediated by Jimmy Carter. The mediator
conveys information back and forth between parties, providing suggestions to steer the peace talks towards
a peaceful conict resolution, and then organizes a summit in which settlement proposals are submitted to
the disputants for approval (see, for example, Kydd, 2003). As is standard in applied theory, the revelation
principle allows us to conveniently summarize the outcomes of the equilibrium play in these more complex
caucuses.
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more favorable terms of settlement than weak players on average. Otherwise, strong players
will not accept the proposed settlements, and will wage war in the expectation of a higher
payo¤. But since strong players tend to receive better settlements the mediator needs to
make sure that weak players do not want to pretend to be strong, when reporting their
information in the rst stage of the intermediation. The mediator can achieve results that
un-mediated communication cannot, by strategically garbling information. She manages
sometimes to keep strong players unaware that their opponents are weak, and convince
them to accept less favorable terms of settlement. In fact, optimal mediation strategies
minimize the expected reward for a weak player to pretend that it is strong, when, in fact,
it did not militarize. As an unintended consequence, optimal mediation strategies also
minimize the equilibrium incentives for a weak player to militarize and become strong at
the arming stage of the game.
In our model, mediation not only improves the chance that disputes are resolved peace-
fully relative to un-mediated peace talks, mediation also reduces equilibrium incentives to
militarize and enter a dispute as a strong player.
2 Literature Review
The results in this paper are related to the study of contests and appropriation (see
Garnkel and Skaperdas, 1996, for a survey). In this conceptualization strategic mili-
tarization is treated as an arms race to prepare for a sure conict in which the military
capacities of each country inuence the war-payo¤s through a contest function. In our
model instead, militarization increases the expected payo¤ of ghting in a dispute but war
is not a foregone conclusion. Players may either reach a settlement or ght; the milita-
rization choice has strategic e¤ects on the settlements, the odds of ghting and the payo¤s
from ghting.
There is also a recent body of theoretical models of endogenous militarization in the
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shadow of negotiation and war ghting. Meirowitz and Sartori (2008) connect militarization
with negotiation but provide only results on the impossibility of avoiding conict. They do
not study optimal mechanisms or make comparisons across di¤erent institutions. Jackson
and Morelli (2009) consider militarization and war, but assume that disputants observe
each others investment decisions prior to negotiations. Thus, there is not incomplete
information in their analysis.
Our study of Myerson mediation falls within the literature of mechanism design that
dates back at least to Hurwicz (1960). But unlike most mechanisms considered in economics
applications, our international conict mediators do not have the power to enforce their
settlement decisions.8 A key distinguishing feature of international relations is that the
players involved are sovereign entities, and hence there is no legitimate or recognized third
party to which they can credibly delegate decision and enforcement power (see e.g. Waltz,
1959). For this reason, mechanism design models of international relations should dispense
with the assumption that the mediators can enforce decisions, and focus on self-enforcing
mechanisms.
In our model militarization is a hidden action and, hence, cannot lead to deterrence.9
Other models have considered the role of observable militarization as a deterrent or a signal
in the context of models of repeated armament (e.g., Garnkel, 1990, Powell, 1993, and
Fearon, 1997), whereas Collier and Hoe­ er (2006) consider deterrence to explain post-
conict military expenditure data in countries that have recently experienced a civil war.
Chassang and Padró (2010) show that while weapons have deterrence e¤ects under com-
plete information in a repeated game, when adding strategic uncertainty there is no longer
8Among the theoretical papers who study self-enforcing mechanisms in contexts di¤erent from inter-
national relations, see Matthews and Postlewaite (1989), Banks and Calvert (1992), Cramton and Palfrey
(1995), Forges (1999), Skreta (2006), Compte and Jehiel (2009), and Goltsman, Hörner, Pavlov and Squin-
tani (2009).
9There cannot be an equilibrium in which players militarize and war does not take place, in any rea-
sonable model of conict in which militarization is a hidden action. In anticipation that war will not take
place, each player would deviate at the militarization stage and secretly choose to devote the resources
earmarked to militarization to welfare enhancing means (see the discussions in Meirowitz and Sartori, 2008,
and Jackson and Morelli, 2009). Observability of militarization is crucial for deterrence. In the words of
Dr. Strangelove: Of course, the whole point of a Doomsday Machine is lost, if you *keep it a secret*!
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a monotonic relationship between the size of an arsenal and the equilibrium degree of de-
terrence. For di¤erent reasons, the e¤ects of endogenous militarization incentives on peace
are non-monotonic also in our model. Taken together with our results, this body of work
may lead one to ask whether mechanisms that improve observability of militarization (such
as espionage or military inspections) would lead to more or less militarization, deterrence,
or conict. We leave these questions for future research.
3 Un-mediated Peace Talks and Militarization
In this section, we develop the baseline model of militarization and negotiation, and then we
augment it to consider un-mediated communication. We show that un-mediated peace talks
help resolve disputes for given militarization decisions. But because this institution creates
the expectation that war among militarized players is less likely, it increases equilibrium
militarization, provided that militarization costs are neither too high, nor too low. In this
case, when militarization strategies are taken into account un-mediated peace talks increase
the overall conict probability.
The Baseline Model of Militarization and Negotiation The analysis starts with
the description of a model of militarization and negotiation with neither mediated nor
un-mediated peace talks.10 The model introduced is deliberately minimal so that its aug-
mentation to include communication and mediation leads to results that are simple to
describe.
Two players, A and B; dispute a pie normalized to unit size. If no peaceful settlement
is reached, the players ght. Conict is treated as a lottery that shrinks the expected value
of the pie to  < 1:11 The odds of winning a war depend on the playersmilitary strength.
10Ideally, this model represents a world in which there is no support for these initiatives by the interna-
tional community.
11Conict destruction need not only consist of physical war damages, but may also include foregone gains
from trade and increased military ow costs.
7
Each players strength is private information, and can be either high, H; or low, L: When
the playersstrength is the same, each wins the war with probability 1=2. When a strong
player ghts a weak one, the former wins with probability p > 1=2; so that its expected
payo¤ is p; whereas the weak players payo¤ is (1   p):12 Note that whether player A
is strong or weak inuences player Bs payo¤ from ghting, hence we are in a context of
private information of interdependent value. In an appendix not submitted for publication,
we show that our results extend in a standard model of conict with continuous military
strengths and contest success functions á-la Tullock (1980).
In the initial militarization stage, A and B each decide whether to remain militarily
weak or to arm and become strong, at a cost k > 0: The militarization decisions are treated
as hidden actions, so neither player observes the choice of the other one.13 We characterize
a mixed arming strategy by q 2 [0; 1]; the probability of arming and becoming strong.14 ;15
For simplicity, given the symmetry of the game, we focus the analysis on equilibria that
are symmetric in the militarization strategies q:
After militarization decisions have been made players attempt to negotiate a peaceful
agreement and avoid a destructive war. Several game forms may be adopted, but none
would succeed in avoiding militarization or conict.16 In the interest of tractability, and to
12We assume that p > 1=2; otherwise the dispute can be trivially resolved by agreeing to split the pie
in half.
13For expositional purposes, we assume that military strength is entirely private information. Our results
hold also if the players have some information on each others military strength, as long as there is also
some residual private information.
14The consideration of mixed strategies should not be taken as literally claiming that players are in-
di¤erent and randomize when making their choices. As is known since Harsanyi (1973), mixed strategy
equilibria can be explained as the limit of pure strategy equilibria of a game in which players are not
precisely sure about the payo¤s of opponents.
15An alternative interpretation of our model is that q is the level of investment in uncertain military
technologies that lead to high military strength with probability q; and low strength otherwise, and that
such technologies bear the linear cost qk: With this interpretation, it is irrelevant for our analysis whether
the level of investment q is observable or unobservable. It is possible to reinterpret military strength as
the resolve of the political and military apparatus, or as the peoples attitudestowards war. In the former
case, the militarizationof the apparatus corresponds to the ine¢ cient appointment of bellicose policy and
military o¢ cers. In the latter case, the (possibly observable) strategy q represents investment in censorship
and military propaganda that costs qk; and that succeeds in radicalizing attitudes with probability q:
16Because militarization is a hidden action, there cannot exist any game of militarization and negotiation
in which players arm with positive probability but do not ght in equilibrium (peace by deterrence). If
players anticipate that they will not ght, then they will secretly deviate from this hypothesized equilibrium
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make the exposition concrete, we represent negotiations as a Nash demand game (see Nash,
1953, and Matthews and Postlewaite, 1989, for the private information case considered
here). Players simultaneously make demands xA and xB both in [0; 1], analogously to
giving their diplomats a set of instructions to . . . bring back at least a share xi of the pie.
If the playersdemands are compatible, i.e., if xA + xB  1; then each player i receives a
split of the pie equal to its demand xi plus half the surplus 1   xA   xB: If the demands
xA and xB are incompatible, i.e., if xA + xB > 1; then the outcome is war. Besides its
simplicity, the Nash demand game is often seen as a reasonable starting point to model
international negotiations.17
To make the exposition more parsimonious, we introduce the parameter   (p  
1=2)=(1=2  =2); which subsumes the two parameters  and p: The numerator of  is the
gain of a strong player from waging war against a weak player instead of accepting the
equal split, and the denominator is the loss from waging war against a strong player rather
than accepting the equal split. So,  represents the ratio of benets over cost of war for
a strong player. Every equilibrium of the whole game of militarization and negotiation
is assessed with three welfare measures: the equilibrium militarization probability q; the
associated ex-ante probability of conict, denoted by C; and the players joint ex-ante
welfare, W  1  C (1  )  2kq:
We do not see the choice of the Nash demand game to represent negotiations as overly
restrictive. This sections results can be shown to hold more generally.18 But it is important
that the Nash demand game has conict equilibria in which the players coordinate on
war with probability one because their demands are incompatible.19 This equilibrium
and choose not to arm. Likewise there cannot exist an equilibrium in which players do not ever militarize,
as each one of them will have the unilateral incentive to secretly militarize and subjugate the opponent.
17Wittman (2009) and Ramsay (2011) use the Nash demand game in their studies of conict. Baliga
and Sjöström (2015) adopt a slightly more elaborated version of Nash demand game as a workhorse model
of conict. Jarque et al. (2003) develop a repeated version of the Nash demand game.
18For example, they hold if adopting many variations of the Nash demand game, including a smoothed
Nash demand game, in which incompatible demands lead to a peaceful settlement with probability de-
creasing in the demandsdistance. And this sections results are preserved also in modications of the
negotiation game that move further away from the Nash demand game.
19Any demand strictly larger than 1  (1  p) leads to war with probability one, because even a weak
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outcome captures instances in which conicts break out because of failure to coordinate
on a peaceful dispute resolution, and is consistent with the historical record.20 Even a
rationalistictheory of war should not exclude the possibility of coordination failure as a
cause of conict (see the discussions in Fey and Ramsay, 2007, and Jackson and Morelli,
2011, for example).
Likewise, the results of the next section (that mediation does not worsen militarization
incentives in international negotiations) hold with any model of negotiations that, just like
the Nash demand game, does not constrain the e¤ectiveness of mediation at the negotiation
stage, after arming decisions have been made. Modeling negotiations with constraining
game forms that limit the role for a mediator is di¢ cult to justify in our context, as one
would like results that are as game-freeas possible in how they treat negotiations.
Solution of the Baseline Model We begin our analysis by solving for equilibrium at
the negotiations stage, after militarization decisions have been made; i.e., we solve the Nash
demand game holding the militarization probability q xed. As a function of q; Lemma 1
reports the equilibrium of the Nash demand game that maximizes the probability V (q) of
peaceful resolution of the dispute.
Lemma 1 As a function of the arming probability q; the equilibrium of the Nash demand
game that maximizes the peace probability V (q) is as follows. For q  = ( + 1) ; the play-
ers always achieve peace by playing xA = xB = 1=2: For = ( + 1) > q  = ( + 2) ; peace
is achieved unless both players are strong; strong players demand xH 2 [p; 1  (1  p) ]
and weak players demand xL = 1   xH : For q < = ( + 2) ; peace is achieved only if both
player who knows that the opponent is strong would prefer to ght than to acquiesce to this demand.
20Failure of coordination on a peaceful solution of disputes can take place for a number of reasons.
For example, conicts may break out because of successful derailment by fringe extremists (e.g., the
assassination of Yitzak Rabin in 1995 contributed to the failure of the Oslo peace process, and WWI started
because of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914). Further, miscalculation
of strength by overcondent or biased leaders may hinder coordination on peaceful conict resolution.
Likewise, miscalculation of negotiation tactics by delegates may lead to the failure of peace brokering
initiatives.
10
players are weak, weak players demand xL = 1=2; whereas strong players trigger war by
demanding xH > 1=2:
A summary of the arguments leading to this result is as follows. When q is su¢ ciently
large, q  = ( + 1) ; each player i = A;B anticipates that the opponent is likely strong,
and prefers not to trigger a ght. Both players demand an equal share xi = 1=2 and
peace is achieved. Conversely, when q < = ( + 1) ; strong players are not afraid to make
prevaricating demands xH > 1=2: When, in addition, q  = ( + 2) ; the risk of facing
a strong player is still su¢ ciently high that weak players want to avoid war and make
demands compatible with the strong playersdemands (i.e., xL = 1  xH): So, war breaks
out only in strong player pairs. Instead, when q is su¢ ciently small, q < = ( + 2) ; weak
players prefer to make demands that trigger war with strong players, and peace is achieved
only by weak player pairs.
Having calculated the optimal equilibrium of the Nash demand game for any given
militarization probability q; we now move one step back and solve for the optimal equi-
librium of the whole game, which includes also the militarization stage. For any given
value of the cost of arming k; Lemma 2 calculates the equilibrium of our militarization
and negotiation game that maximizes the playerswelfare W; calculated as a function of
the equilibrium militarization probability q; and of the corresponding equilibrium proba-
bility V (q) of a peaceful negotiation resolution.21 For expositional ease, we here report
only the case in which the militarization cost k is neither too small, nor too large. Specif-
ically, we work under the parameter restriction that k  k  (1  ) =2  = ( + 1) and
k  k  (1  ) =2  ( + 1) = ( + 2) :22
Lemma 2 When the cost of arming k 2 [k; k]; the equilibrium of the militarization and
negotiation game that maximizes the playerswelfare W is such that each player militarizes
21Formally, the equilibrium welfare is W = 1  (1  V (q)) (1  ) 2kq; whereas the equilibrium conict
probability is C = 1  V (q) :
22The full characterization of equilibrium for the complementary military cost range is in an appendix
not submitted for publication.
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with probability q(k) =    2k=(1   ) 2 [= ( + 2) ; = ( + 1)]; strong players demand
xH = p; weak players demand xL = 1  p; and war breaks out if and only if both players
are strong.
This result is proven in two steps. First, we show that when the arming cost k lies
between k and k; there is an equilibrium of the militarization and negotiation game in
which players arm with probability q (k) =   2k=(1  ) 2 [= ( + 2) ; = ( + 1)]; strong
players demand xH = p in the Nash demand game, weak players demand xL = 1 p; and
war breaks out if and only if both players are strong. Intuitively, when the militarization
cost k is neither too small, k  k; nor too large, k  k; players are willing to randomize their
arming decision q with intermediatevalues that lie between = ( + 2) and = ( + 1) : At
the negotiation stage, the strategies of this equilibrium are consistent with the equilibria
selected by Lemma 1. Hence, this equilibrium maximizes the peace probability V (q) at
the negotiation stage.23
The second step is based on showing that there cannot exist any other equilibrium with
a smaller militarization probability q: This is because, for = ( + 2)  q < = ( + 1) ;
the equilibrium of Lemma 2 yields the highest possible payo¤s to weak players, the lowest
payo¤s to strong players, and hence the lowest ex-ante equilibrium incentives to militarize.
At the negotiation stage, strong players demand xH = p in the Nash demand game, weak
players demand xL = 1   p; and war breaks out if and only if both players are strong.
There cannot exist any equilibrium with lower strong playerspayo¤s, as these players can
secure exactly these payo¤s by ghting. Conversely, there cannot be any equilibrium of the
Nash demand game with higher weak playerspayo¤s. This is because the equilibrium of
Lemma 2 minimizes the probability that weak players get involved in ghts, and awards
them the highest possible share of the pie, 1  p; that avoids conict with strong players.
23Note also that the arming strategy q (k) =    2k=(1   ) decreases in k and is such that




= = ( + 2): The equilibrium probability q(k) spans the entire range
[= ( + 2) ; = ( + 1)] for which the optimal equilibrium of the Nash demand game is such that war
breaks out only if both players are strong.
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Because the equilibrium of Lemma 2 minimizes the arming probability q at the milita-
rization stage, and maximizes the peace probability V (q) in the ensuing negotiation stage,
it immediately follows that it maximizes welfareW in the whole game of militarization and
negotiation.
Un-Mediated Peace Talks The previous part of the section has described the game
of militarization and negotiation. We now augment this game by adding an intermediate
stage. We assume that after the militarization stage, but before the negotiation game is
played, direct bilateral peace talks take place. Talks are modeled as a meeting in which the
players share information and attempt to nd a (self-enforcing) agreement to coordinate
their future play. In the meeting, both players i = A;B simultaneously send unveriable
messagesmi 2 fl; hg to each other, so as to represent their arming strength L or H:24 Then,
the meeting continues with the players trying to nd an agreement. Every equilibrium has
the following form: with some probability, the meeting is successful,and the players agree
on a peaceful resolution. With complementary probability, the meeting fails and leads
to conict escalation. In any equilibrium in which information is meaningfully revealed,
the probability that the meeting results in a peaceful resolution depends on the players
self-reported arming strengths.
In more formal terms, we allow players to make use of a joint randomization device,
whose realization is observed by both players. So, players can possibly coordinate on dif-
ferent equilibria of the negotiation game, as a function of both their messages and the
realization of the randomization device.25 It is important that we can exploit the equi-
librium multiplicity of the Nash demand game to model the possibility that the players
attempts to coordinate on a peaceful outcome fails. Not only this is a realistic assumption,
24For simplicity, we assume that only one round of unmediated communication takes place.
25The same communication model is used by Krishna and Morgan (2004) and Aumann and Hart (2003)
in di¤erent contexts. The latter prove that joint randomization can be reconstructed as simultaneous cheap
talk. Hence, by allowing for public randomization devices we are ensuring that the logic of our result holds
for a large class of models of communication (albeit in a reduced form representation).
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as already pointed out earlier. It is also the only reason why un-mediated peace talks suc-
ceed in strictly improving the chance of peaceful resolution of disputes at the negotiation
stage, after arming decisions have been made. It can be proved that absent this possibility
of coordination on di¤erent equilibria of the Nash demand game, un-mediated peace talks
would not improve the chance of peaceful dispute resolution (and hence, they would not
be organized in the rst place). As anticipated in the introduction, this insight is novel
and complements the ndings of Baliga and Sjöström (2004), whose model of un-mediated
peace talks does not include the possibility of a meeting that acts as a joint randomization
device to select across di¤erent continuation equilibria.
These insights are formalized in Lemma 3. For brevity, this results focuses on the case
that   1; or equivalently that (p + 1=2)    1; i.e., that war is not too destructive and
the strong players military advantage is signicant.26 Of course, for any xed probability
of militarization q; there exists uninformative, babbling, equilibria in the game with un-
mediated peace talks that induce the same outcomes and probability of peace V (q) as
the equilibria of the Nash demand game without peace talks. Most importantly, there
also exists equilibria that strictly improve the probability of peace V (q); except for the
trivial case in which q  =( + 1) where peace is achieved even in the Nash demand
game without peace talks. Lemma 3 characterizes these equilibria that strictly improve
the chance of peace V (q), focusing on equilibria with pure communication strategies for
clarity of exposition. The statement uses the functions pM and pH dened as follows:
pM (q) = 1= [(1 + )  2q= (1  q)] and pH (q) = 0 for q < =( + 2); and pM = 1 and
pH = 1  = [q( + 2)] for =( + 2)  q  =( + 1):
Lemma 3 For any given arming probability q; there exist equilibria of the negotiation game
with un-mediated peace talks with at least the same peace chance V (q) as the equilibria of
the negotiation game without peace talks. For any   1 and any q < =( + 1); there also
exist equilibria with pure communication strategies that strictly increase the peace chance.
26The characterization of the equilibria that improve peace chance V (q) with respect to the Nash demand
game without peace talks for the case  < 1 is in Lemma 3B in the appendix.
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In every such equilibrium, players truthfully reveal their arming strength. Then, strong
player pairs coordinate on the peaceful demands xA = 1=2; xB = 1=2 with probability
pH  pH (q) ; and ght with probability 1 pH ; asymmetric pairs (H;L) settle on the peaceful
demands (b; 1  b), where b 2 [p; 1  (1  p) ] ; with probability pM  pM (q) ; and ght
with probability 1   pM ; the case for (L;H) is symmetric; and weak player pairs achieve
peace with probability one, with demands (1=2; 1=2): The equilibrium that maximizes V (q)
is such that b = p; pM = pM (q) and pH = pH (q) :
This result is best explained by considering the equilibrium that maximizes the peace
chance, V (q); and by comparing it to the equilibrium that maximizes V (q) in the Nash
demand game without communication, reported in Lemma 1. In both cases, the players
play a separating equilibrium; i.e., the players reveal their strengths by means of their
equilibrium choices. But in the Nash demand game without peace talks, this information
is revealed only after demands are made, whereas with un-mediated communication, the
information is shared before the demands are made. Sharing information before demands
are made allows the players to use this information more e¢ ciently in the negotiation
game, thereby improving the chance that the players coordinate on a peaceful outcome.
Specically, when =( + 2)  q < =( + 1); the equilibrium that maximizes V (q) in the
Nash demand game without peace talks involves war with probability one among strong
players. The introduction of un-mediated peace talks in the Nash demand game makes it
possible for strong players to coordinate on a peaceful outcome resolution with the strictly
positive probability pH (q) : Similarly, when q < =(+2); the addition of un-mediated peace
talks to the Nash demand game improves the chance of peace from zero to pM (q) > 0; in
asymmetric pairs composed of a strong and a weak player.
We now turn to consider the implications of un-mediated peace in the whole game of
militarization and negotiation, and provide the main result of this section, Proposition 1.
Let us dene as equilibrium selection of the negotiation game with un-mediated peace talks,
a function that associates an equilibrium to every given arming probability q: Proposition
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1 considers every equilibrium selection that (uniformly and strictly) increases the chance of
peace V (q) relative to the negotiation game without peace talks. It shows that they all lead
to higher equilibrium militarization q in the whole game of militarization and negotiation,
relative to the game without peace talks.27 This e¤ect is so severe that un-mediated peace
talks also increase the overall level of conict C, and reduce the ex-ante playerswelfare
W: While the characterization of the equilibria of the negotiation game with un-mediated
peace talks of Lemma 3 focuses on pure communication strategy equilibria, Proposition
1 covers also the case of mixed strategy equilibria, if any exists. Again, we restrict the
statement to   1 for ease of exposition.28
Proposition 1 For any militarization cost k 2 [k; k]; and benet/cost ratio parameter
  1; every equilibrium selection of the negotiation game with un-mediated peace talks
that uniformly strictly increases the peace probability V (q) relative to the negotiation game
without peace talks, leads to a strict increase of equilibrium militarization probability q; to a
strict increase in the overall conict probability C; and to a strict decrease of ex-ante welfare
W; in the associated equilibrium of the whole game of militarization and negotiation.
The intuition for this result is that, in some sense, un-mediated peace talks are victims
of their own success. We know from Lemma 2 that, for k 2 [k; k]; the optimal equilibrium
of the militarization and negotiation game without peace talks is such that the arming
strategy q lies between =( + 2) and =( + 1); players ght only if both are strong, and
weak players obtain 1=2 when facing a weak player, and 1  p when facing a strong one.
The key step in our argument is that it is impossible to raise the weak playerspayo¤s,
and to lower the strong playerspayo¤s, in any equilibrium of the negotiation game with
un-mediated peace talks.
27There are also uninformative equilibria that induce the same outcomes as the negotiation game without
peace talks. The focus on informative equilibria that improve the chance of peace V (q) is justied by simple
forward-inductionarguments. There are signicant political and nancial costs to organize peace talks. It
does not seem plausible that belligerent parties would go through all this trouble to meet and only babble.
28The analysis for  < 1 is in an appendix not submitted for publication.
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Consider the militarization and negotiation game with un-mediated peace talks. For
brevity, let us focus on the case in which players use pure equilibrium strategies at the
negotiation stage, i.e., they play according to the characterization of Lemma 3.29 Then,
as in the militarization and negotiation game without peace talks, the playersequilibrium
arming strategy q lies between =(+2) and =(+1); when k 2 [k; k]: Most importantly,
the weak playersexpected payo¤s cannot be higher than in the equilibrium of the game
without peace talks of Lemma 2: Their payo¤ is 1=2 against weak opponents, whereas it
is 1  b  1  p with probability pM  1; and (1  p) < 1  p with probability 1  pM ;
when facing strong opponents. In the equilibrium of the militarization and negotiation
game without peace talks characterized in Lemma 2 instead, the weak playerspayo¤ is
1  p with probability one.
Turning to the expected payo¤ of becoming strong, we see that it is higher with un-
mediated peace talks than without communication. Relative to the equilibrium of Lemma
2, every equilibrium of Lemma 3 reduces the probability that strong player pairs ght from
one to 1   pH ; so that strong players achieve weakly larger payo¤s when they face weak
players.
Because un-mediated peace talks raise the payo¤s of strong players and weakly lower
weak players payo¤s, they induce players to choose a higher equilibrium militarization
probability q: If the probability q that the opponent militarize did not increase, each player
is expected benet for arming would outweigh the expected punishment. Player i would
then have a strict preference to militarize. This is impossible in equilibrium because ran-
domization at the arming stage requires that the players are indi¤erent between militarizing
or not.
For any given probability q; the probability V (q) that ongoing disputes are resolved
peacefully is increased by un-mediated peace talks. But this probability, V (q) ; decreases
with higher militarization, q; and this makes the overall probability of conict, C, higher
29Mixed strategy equilibria are dealt with in the proof of Proposition 1, in appendix.
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in the militarization and negotiation game with un-mediated peace talks, than in the game
without peace talks.
To see why this last result holds, denote by q and by q^; respectively, the militarization
probability in the optimal equilibrium of the game without peace talks and of the game with
un-mediated peace talks, and denote by C = q2 and C^ = q^2 (1  pH), the associated conict
probabilities. Suppose by contradiction that C  C^, un-mediated peace talks do not
increase the equilibrium conict probability relative to the militarization and negotiation
game without peace talks.
Consider the probability that a strong player ghts in equilibrium. Because weak players
do not ght, this probability is q in the game without peace talks and q^(1 pH) in the game
with un-mediated peace talks. The probability that the opponent is strong is higher with
un-mediated peace talks than without; q^ > q: So, if it were the case that C = q2  C^ =
q^2 (1  pH) ; it would follow that q2 > q^2 (1  pH); the probability that a strong player ghts
would be lower in the game with peace talks than in the game without communication.
Because the only punishment for militarization is conict in strong player pairs, players
would then strictly prefer to militarize, but again this is impossible in equilibrium. Thus,
it must be the case that C < C^; un-mediated peace talks increase the equilibrium conict
probability relative to the game without communication. And because un-mediated peace
talks increase the equilibrium arming probability q and the overall conict probability C;
it is immediate that they also reduce the welfare W:
4 Mediation
We have shown that in our model, bilateral un-mediated peace talks, exactly because of
the way that they reduce the risk of conict in ongoing disputes, lead to more equilib-
rium militarization and a higher level of conict. We now show that there exist forms of
third-party intermediation that improve the e¤ectiveness of peace talks over un-mediated
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communication, without leading to more militarization.
Optimal Mediation, Given Militarization The specic form of intermediation we
consider is inspired by the work of Myerson, and we call it Myerson mediation, or me-
diation for brevity. A Myerson mediator is a neutral or honest brokerwho does not
favor either of the players. The mediator has a mandate to set the agenda of the peace
talks and to steer the proceedings, so as to try and resolve the dispute that she is called
to mediate. Her narrowmandate cannot realistically include also shaping the beliefs and
incentives of potential future players, who base militarization choices also on expectations
on how mediators will deal with eventual disputes. So, a mediator in our model takes
the symmetric equilibrium militarization probability q as given, and tries to maximize the
chance of a peaceful resolution of the dispute she is mediating.
We begin our analysis by applying the revelation principleof Myerson (1982) to our
Nash demand negotiation game. An optimal way for the mediator to set the agenda is as
follows. First, the players report their information independently to the mediator. Second,
the mediator organizes and steers a meeting in which she submits a settlement proposal
to the players. After the proposals are made, the players bargain according to the Nash
demand game, as in the model of un-mediated peace talks of the previous section.30 Again,
every equilibrium is such that, with some probability, the meeting is successful and the
playersdemands align with the mediators proposals; with complementary probability, the
meeting fails and conict breaks out; and the probability that the meeting is successful
depends on the mediators proposals. Further, for any given militarization probability, q;
this negotiation game with mediation has an equilibrium that maximizes the chance of
peace, V (q); in which the mediators proposal strategies lead the players to reveal all their
private information to the mediator, in anticipation of the proposals that she will make.
Disputants do not report information directly to each other, but through a mediator
30Alternatively, we could assume that the proposals are submitted for independent approval to the two
players, and are implemented if both players approve them, as in Hörner, Morelli and Squintani (2015).
As we prove in the appendix, our results are exactly the same with these two game forms.
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whose conduct is inspired by a principle of condentiality. As we explain later in more
detail, players have better incentives to disclose their type condentially to the mediator
than they have when communicating directly. Further, the mediator makes the settlement
proposals and steers the peace talks optimally. As a result, mediation improves the chances
that peace talks are successful and the dispute is resolved peacefully, relative to the game
with un-mediated peace talks (and to the game without peace talks), for any given arming
probability q:
Lemma 4 describes the optimal mediation strategies, given the militarization probability
q: To minimize the chance that an ongoing dispute turns into war, mediators must be able
to commit to mediation strategies that include the possibility that peace talks fail. With
some probability, mediators must be able to quit the peace talks, when one or both players
claim to be strong, although this leads to escalation of conict. Such commitments make
information disclosure by the contestants possible, as they provide a punishmentfor weak
players who lie and pretend they are strong. On the basis of all the evidence available, it
seems realistic to allow for the possibility that mediators are capable of committing to quit
peace talks if some contingencies arise.31 ;32
Additionally, our model does not include the possibility of negotiation outside the me-
diation process. Players are not likely to go back to the negotiation table in the attempt
to broker a deal without the help of the mediator, once the mediation process has failed.33
Nevertheless, our results do not change if there is a positive probability that players can
31For example, the online appendix of Hörner, Morelli and Squintani (2015) provides empirical evidence
that mediators, disputants and the international community recognize the value of a mediators commit-
ment to quit. Successful mediators achieve a reputation of not bending the rules and procedures that they
set out at the inception of the mediation, including the commitment to quit in a set of pre-determined
circumstances.
32We have also interviewed a real-life experienced mediator, Mr. Gianluca Esposito, Executive Secretary
at the Council of Europe, who participated in a number of international mediations, including the ones
associated with the Bosnian war. He conrmed that mediators understand very much the importance of
being able to credibly set the rules of the mediation process, and credibly threaten to quit if players persist
with excessive demands (i.e., in the context of our paper, if both report to be militarily strong). The views
expressed by Gianluca Esposito do not necessarily reect the views of the Council of Europe.
33There are many reasons for this. For example, audience costsare recognized to provide an important
channel that makes war threats credible in case of failed negotiations (e.g., Tomz, 2007).
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renegotiate after the mediated peace talks fail, or if there is a positive probability that the
mediator called to settle the dispute is not capable of quitting, as long as these probabil-
ities are not too large. When this is the case, the optimal mediation strategies can fully
accommodate for these exogenous probabilities by increasing the probability that mediators
capable of commitment quit in the appropriate circumstances.
Lemma 4 For any given militarization strategy q; the optimal equilibrium of the nego-
tiation game with Myerson mediation is characterized as follows. Each player truthfully
reveals its strength to the mediator. Strong player pairs coordinate on the peaceful demands
(1=2; 1=2) with probability qH ; and ght with probability 1   qH ; asymmetric pairs (H;L)
coordinate on the peaceful demands (p; 1  p) with probability pM ; on the demands (1=2;
1=2) with probability qM ; and ght with probability 1 pM qM  the case for (L;H) is sym-
metric; and weak player pairs do not ght and achieve the payo¤s (1=2; 1=2) in expectation.
When q  =(+2), qH = qM = 0; and 0 < pM < pM < 1; when =(+2)  q < =(+1),
pM + qM = 1; 0 < pH < qH < 1 and qM 2 (0; 1) ; and when q  =( + 1); qM = qH = 1:34
Whenever  < 1 and/or q  =(+2); as long as q < =(+1); mediation strictly increases
the peace chance V (q) relative to any equilibrium of the negotiation game with un-mediated
peace talks. For all values of q and ; mediation weakly increases the chance of peace V (q) :
The above characterization of optimal mediation strategies is based on the following
insights. First note that a strong, militarized player must receive more favorable terms of
settlement on average than a weak player. Otherwise, the strong player would reject the
settlement, in the expectation that the war payo¤will be larger. But favorable settlements
to self-reported strong players provide an incentive for weak players to lie and pretend
to be strong, when reporting their information to the mediator. To support the optimal
equilibrium, the settlement proposal strategies are such that weak players do not want to lie.
The key insight here is that a weak player is more willing to reveal its strength condentially
34The precise formulas are as follows: when q  =( + 2), pM = 1 q(+1)(1 q) 2q ; and when
=( + 2)  q < =( + 1), qH = 1 qq 2q (1 q)(+1)(1 q) q and qM = 1 2q (1 q)(+1)(1 q) q :
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to a mediator who adopts optimal strategies, than she is when communicating directly with
the opponent. This is because the mediator does not always reveal that one is weak to her
opponent.
Consider the case of   1 and =( + 2)  q < =( + 1): If revealing its arming
strength to a strong opponent, the weak player will surely need to accept a low payo¤,
1   p; to secure peace. If instead it is communicating through the mediator, the weak
player is proposed 1=2 of the pie with probability qM ; and the lower payo¤ 1 p only with
probability pM = 1   qM : When receiving the proposal (1=2; 1=2), the strong player does
not know if the opponent is strong or weak. The randomization value qM is chosen so as to
make the strong player exactly indi¤erent between accepting the proposal (1=2; 1=2) and
ghting.35
Because mediation raises the expected payo¤of weak players who truthfully report their
strength, it achieves separation between weak and strong players with a lower punishment
for weak players who lie and pretend to be strong, i.e., with a lower equilibrium conict
probability among self-reported strong players, than un-mediated peace talks. Formally,
it is the case that qH(q) > pH(q); for any given militarization probability q 2 [=( +
2); =(+1)): All other player pairs avoid conict with probability one, both with mediated
and with un-mediated peace talks, pM (q) + qM (q) = 1 and pM (q) = 1: Hence, mediation
strictly increases the peace chance V (q) relative to any equilibrium of the negotiation
game with un-mediated peace talks. So, for   1 and any given arming probability
=( + 2)  q < =( + 1); the optimal mediation strategies cannot be reconstructed with
un-mediated peace talks, and mediation strictly improves the chance of peaceful dispute
resolution.36
35As a result, optimal mediation strategies minimize the di¤erence between strong and weak players
expected payo¤s, among all mediation strategies pM ; pH and qH that make the playerstruthfully reveal
their types. Later, we will see how this also creates optimal incentives for militarization.
36The analysis of the other cases in which mediation strictly increases the peace chance V (q) is analogous,
and we deal with it in the proof of Lemma 4, in the appendix. The result that mediation weakly increases
the chance of peace V (q) for all values of q and  is an immediate consequence of the revelation principle
by Myerson (1982).
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In short, the mediator improves the equilibrium chances that peace talks are successful,
by collecting information condentially from the players, and by making settlement pro-
posals that do not fully reveal the playersstrengths. Such a condential management of
information cannot be achieved by un-mediated peace talks in which the disputants meet
face to face.
Mediation and Militarization We now build on the characterization of the optimal
equilibrium of the negotiation game with mediation (Lemma 4), to solve for the milita-
rization equilibrium probability q given that the ensuing dispute is solved optimally with
Myerson mediation. The following result characterizes the equilibrium militarization and
negotiation strategies. It shows that mediation does not su¤er from the drawbacks of un-
mediated bilateral peace talks. Not only does the mediator improve the peace chance given
militarization strategies q; she also improves welfare in the whole game, which includes the
militarization decisions.
Proposition 2 Consider a game of militarization and negotiation with a mediator who
adopts the optimal mediation strategies described in Lemma 4. For any militarization cost
k 2 [k; k]; the unique equilibrium militarization strategy is q(k) = (1+)[2k (1 )]
2k(2+) (1+)2(1 ) ; which
strictly decreases in k and is such that q(k) = (+1)=[+(+1)2] and q(k) = =(+2):
Mediation strictly reduces the overall conict and militarization probabilities C and q; and
strictly increases the welfareW; with respect to any equilibrium of the game of militarization
and negotiation with un-mediated peace talks, or without communication.
Despite the mediatorsnarrow mandates to only minimize the chance of conict out-
break in the disputes they mediate, Proposition 2 nds that optimal mediation strategies
do not lead to higher equilibrium militarization. They strictly improve the chances of peace
and welfare relative to all equilibria of the game of militarization and negotiations with
un-mediated peace talks, or without communication.
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The arguments that yield Proposition 2 are summarized as follows. We have seen in
Proposition 1 that un-mediated peace talks raise equilibrium militarization because, by im-
proving the chance of peace in the negotiation game, they raise the payo¤s of strong players
and weakly lower the weak playerspayo¤s. Instead, optimal mediation strategies increase
the probability of peace in strong player pairs without increasing the strong playerspayo¤s,
relative to the game of militarization and negotiation without (mediated or un-mediated)
peace talks. As explained after Lemma 4, in fact, the strong playersexpected payo¤s in
the optimally mediated negotiation game exactly equal their payo¤s when ghting, just
like the strong playerspayo¤s of the optimal equilibrium of the negotiation game without
peace talks (cf. Lemma 2). Further, optimal mediation strategies strictly increase the weak
playerspayo¤s relative to the negotiation game without communication. Again, this is in
contrast with un-mediated peace talks: as we have seen in Lemma 3, they cannot raise the
payo¤ of weak players relative to the game of militarization and negotiation without peace
talks.
As noted above, these di¤erences between mediated and un-mediated communication
arise because the mediator collects information condentially from the players, and makes
proposals that do not fully reveal a players strength to its opponent. This form of informa-
tion management cannot be achieved by un-mediated peace talks in which the disputants
meet face to face. The implications are that, while the adoption of un-mediated peace talks
to settle conicts raises equilibrium arming in our model, optimal mediation strategies im-
prove the chances of peaceful dispute resolution without generating negative militarization
distortions.
The Institutional Optimality of Mediation The previous part of this section proved
that mediation is not only more e¤ective than un-mediated peace talks at improving the
chance of peace in ongoing disputes, but also that it keeps in check equilibrium milita-
rization. We now provide a stronger result. Mediation achieves the same welfare as a
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hypothetical optimal third party intervention mechanism in which the third party has the
broader mandate to commit to punishplayers for militarizing as they enter a dispute in the
rst place.37 That is, a hypothetical mediator with the broadmandate to maximize total
welfare and keep equilibrium militarization in control can do no better than the Myerson
mediator with a narrowand more realistic mandate to only foster the peaceful resolution
of the dispute that she is called to settle.38
Theorem 1 Myerson mediation achieves the same welfare, and the same militarization
and conict probability, as a hypothetical optimal institution that recommends militarization
strategies, collects players arming strength reports, and makes settlement proposals, with the
objective to maximize playerswelfare W:
This result holds because there does not exist any (budget-balanced) mechanism that
can increase the weak playersexpected payo¤s, nor reduce the strong playerspayo¤s, rela-
tive to Myerson mediation. In fact, regardless of whether they are proposed the settlement
payo¤ of 1=2 or p; strong players are exactly indi¤erent between accepting the mediators
proposal and ghting. Hence, their payo¤s cannot be further decreased with any other
mechanism, and conversely the weak playersshare of the pie cannot be further increased.
At the same time, the mediators optimal strategies maximize the probability that the
dispute is resolved peacefully, and hence that the pie is not damaged by conict. Because
there does not exist any mechanism that can increase the weak playerspayo¤s, nor reduce
the strong playerspayo¤s, Myerson mediation minimizes equilibrium militarization among
all budget-balanced mechanisms.
37Such an optimal hypothetical institution is not likely available in the real world, and serves only as
benchmark to assess how much is lost by the narrow mediators mandate. We maintain the assumption that
this third party does not have access to privileged information beyond what it gathers from communication
with the players, and that she is constrained by a balanced budget. That is, she cannot bribe or punish
the players to force them to settle their dispute. The mandate of this hypothetical third party is dened
precisely in the appendix.
38As we explained after Lemma 4, our analysis and results do not change if if there is a positive probability
that the players can renegotiate when the mediator quits the peace talks, or that the mediator called to settle
the dispute is not capable to commit to quit, as long as these probabilities are not too large. Specically,
we show in the appendix that Theorem 1 extends whenever k  k; as long as the sum of these probabilities
is not larger than a given threshold, which is a function of the models parameters.
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Importantly, this virtuous e¤ect on militarization is only an unintended consequence of
the mediatorsobjective to resolve peacefully the disputes they are called to settle. By the
revelation principle, these objectives are achieved with equilibria in which players reveal
their strength to the mediator truthfully. Further, strong players must be o¤ered more
favorable terms of settlement on average, than weak players. Else, they will not accept
the proposed settlements, as they expect a higher payo¤ from triggering a conict. This
generates an incentive for weak players to lie and pretend that they are stronger, when
they report their strength to the mediator. The most potent punishment to discourage
weak players from lying is the expectation of conict among self-reported strong players.
But the mediations objective is that this punishment is used on path with the smallest
possible probability. So, the optimal peaceful settlements proposals are designed to keep
the expected payo¤s of weak players as high as possible when they reveal their strength,
and as low as possible when they pretend to be stronger (within the constraint that such
proposals need to be acceptable to both strong and weak players).
In other words, Myerson mediation keeps the expected settlement payo¤s of self-reported
weak players as high as possible, and the payo¤s of self-reported strong players as low as
possible. As a consequence, mediation winds up making the equilibrium expected payo¤s
of strong players as low as possible, and the equilibrium payo¤s of weak players as high as
possible, among all budget-balanced mechanism.
In short, the optimal mediation strategies are designed to minimize the expected reward
for a weak player to pretend that it is strong, when, in fact, it did not militarize; but as an
unintended consequence, they also minimize the equilibrium incentives for the weak player
to militarize and become strong. So, optimal mediation strategies yield the smallest possible
equilibrium arming probability q in the game of militarization and negotiation, among all
budget-balanced mechanism. By construction, they also maximize the chance of peace
given any militarization strategy q. Hence, we conclude that optimal Myerson mediation
strategies maximize the overall playerswelfare, among all budget-balanced mechanisms.
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5 Conclusion
This paper pushes scholars of conict to broaden their eld of vision in thinking about
institutions. How players engaged in a dispute negotiate a¤ects more than whether the
disputes that emerge are resolved peacefully. By shaping militarization incentives, conict
resolution institutions inuence the types of disputes that emerge. To the extent that
engagement in a costly and destructive war can be seen as the punishment for arming and
entering a dispute, institutions that reduce the chances of open conict in emerged disputes
may lead to more militarization and make more dangerous disputes emerge.
We show that considering militarization is important when assessing the overall e¤ec-
tiveness of conict resolution institutions. In our model, the use of un-mediated peace
talks, while e¤ective in improving the chance of peace for a given distribution of military
strength, leads to more equilibrium militarization and ultimately to higher chances of con-
ict outbreak. Happily, not all conict resolution institutions su¤er from these drawbacks.
We identify a form of third-party intervention that brokers peace in ongoing disputes ef-
fectively, and also minimizes equilibrium militarization.
This paper also contributes to our understanding of communication and negotiations
in international relations. A series of papers going back to at least Kydd (2003) studies
the question of whether mediation improves upon direct un-mediated communication in
ongoing disputes. At the heart of this debate is whether there is value in a mediator with
no independent private information, and without a budget to intervene militarily or create
external incentives. In the case each players private information is of private value, e.g.,
when it concerns the individual cost of war, the answer is no (Fey and Ramsay, 2010). But
the answer is yes when considering private information of interdependent value, such as
ones arming strength for example (Hörner, Morelli and Squintani, 2015).39 This paper has
39The di¤erence hinges on the role of mediators condentiality in peace talks. Because of the media-
tors condentiality, players have better incentives to disclose their information than when communicating
directly. By adopting a non-fully revealing recommendation strategy, the mediator optimally shapes each
players equilibrium beliefs about the opponents strength. In settings with interdependent values, this
belief is important as it inuences the players equilibrium demands. But in settings with private values
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identied a separate reason why mediation improves upon un-mediated communication: the
latter breeds perverse equilibrium militarization incentives, whereas the former minimizes
equilibrium militarization.
We conclude by relating our ndings with the study of optimal taxation with mechanism
design, a large literature that dates back at least to Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). The issue
of tax evasion is of course a main concern of policy-makers. Tax auditing is an imperfect
system to tackle tax evasion, and one may want to complement it with direct mechanisms
that discourage income under-reporting, especially by high income earners. And at the
same time, a concern of the optimal taxation literature is that the tax system does not
reduce the incentives to work and increase ones income. Our results may be related to these
issues. We have found that the optimal mediation mechanism simultaneously discourages
weak players from falsely reporting that they are strong, and minimizes the equilibrium
incentive that they militarize and become strong in the rst place. This suggests that
results that identify taxation schemes that do not upset income generation incentives may
also provide insights on how to foster truthful income reporting.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, note that for q=2+(1  q) p  1=2; or q  = ( + 1) ; both
weak and strong players can achieve peace by coordinating on the claims xA = xB = 1=2:
When q < = ( + 1) ; it is impossible that strong player pairs achieve peace. But it is
possible to achieve peace for all other pairs of players in equilibrium, as long as strong
and weak playersdemands are compatible, i.e., xL + xH = 1: Also, a strong player must
prefer to demand xH rather than triggering war against a weak player by making a higher
demand (if meeting a strong player, the demands will result in war anyway). Hence, we
need that xH  p. Further, a weak player must prefer to demand xL rather than triggering
war with a strong player, but collecting a higher share of the pie with a weak player, by
making the demand 1   xL. This requirement translates into the following inequality:
(1  q) =2 + qxL  (1  q) (1  xL) + q (1  p) : Bringing together these two conditions,
we obtain the conditions that q  = ( + 2) : When this condition fails, it is impossible to
achieve peace for asymmetric pairs composed of a strong and a weak player. As a result,
only weak players pairs achieve peace, by demanding xL = 1=2:
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof proceeds in two parts.
In the rst part, we suppose that the Nash demand game is played according to the
equilibrium selection of Lemma 1 with xH = p for = ( + 2)  q < = ( + 1) :
As a function of the equilibrium militarization strategy q; the expected payo¤ of arming
and becoming strong is:
U(H; q) =
8><>: (1  q)p + q=2  k if q < = ( + 1)1=2  k if q  = ( + 1) ; (1)
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whereas the expected payo¤ of not arming is:
U(L; q) =
8>>>><>>>>:
(1  q)=2 + q(1  p) if q < = ( + 2)
(1  q)=2 + q(1  p) if = ( + 2)  q < = ( + 1)
1=2 if q  = ( + 1) :
(2)
The equilibrium arming probability q is given by the indi¤erence equation
U(H; q) = U(L; q): (3)
It is immediate that this equation cannot hold for any q  = ( + 1) ; because k 
k > 0 implies U(H; q) < U(L; q): For q < = ( + 1) ; the function U(H; q) is linear in
q with negative slope   (p  1=2) : The function U(L; q) is piecewise linear in q with a
discontinuity point at q = = ( + 2) such that limq"=(+2) U(L; q) < limq#=(+2) U(L; q):
The function U(L; q) has negative slope   (1=2  (1  p)) for q < = ( + 2) ; and negative
slope   (p   1=2) on = ( + 2)  q < = ( + 1) : Because U(H; q) = p   k > 1=2 =
U(L; q) for q = 0 and the slope of U(H; q) is less negative than the slope of U(L; q) for
q < = ( + 2) ; the indi¤erence equation (3) cannot have a solution q < = ( + 2) :
Because the slope of U(H; q) is more negative than the slope of U(L; q) for = ( + 2) 
q < = ( + 1) ; there can exist at most a single value of q such that equation (3) holds,
and this equilibrium militarization strategy q lies in [= ( + 2) ; = ( + 1)): Solving the
resulting equation p(1 q)+q=2 k = (1 q)=2+q(1 p) yields the solution q(k) =  
2k=(1 ): This function decreases in k and is such that q(k) = = ( + 2) and limk#k q(k) =
= ( + 1) :
We have concluded that, if the Nash demand game is played according to the equilibrium
selection of Lemma 1 with xH = p for = ( + 2)  q < = ( + 1) ; then for any k 2 (k; k];
the militarization and negotiation game has an equilibrium in which players arm with
probability q (k) =  2k=(1 ) 2 [= ( + 2) ; = ( + 1)); strong players demand xH = p;
weak players demand xL = 1 p; and war erupts only if both players are strong, as stated
in the proposition proved here. This equilibrium exists also for k = k; because also for
q = = ( + 1) ; the Nash demand game has an equilibrium in which peace is achieved
unless both players are strong, strong players demand xH = p and weak players demand
xL = 1  p:
The second part of the proof shows that the equilibrium just described maximizes the
playerswelfare W in the militarization and negotiation game.
Consider any other equilibrium of the whole militarization and negotiation game, hence
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allowing for any equilibrium of the Nash demand game, beyond the equilibrium selected in
Lemma 1.
Suppose that q  = ( + 1) : In this case, strong players ght each other in any equi-
librium of the Nash demand game, and obtain the payo¤ of =2: A strong players payo¤
against a weak player cannot be lower than p in any equilibrium of the Nash demand
game, because the strong player can guarantee at least that payo¤ by ghting. Hence,
for any q  = ( + 1) ; the equilibrium expected payo¤ U^(H; q) of arming and becoming
strong cannot be lower than the payo¤ U(H; q) reported in expression (1) determined by
the Nash demand game equilibrium selection of Lemma 1.
Conversely, we now show that the equilibrium expected payo¤ U^(L; q) of remaining
weak cannot be higher than the payo¤ U(L; q) of expression (2), which is also determined
by the equilibrium of Lemma 1. For every q  = ( + 1) ; in fact, the equilibrium of
Lemma 1 minimizes the probability that weak players ght, and gives them the highest
possible share of the pie xL = 1  p that secures peace when meeting a strong opponent,
in the case that = ( + 2)  q < = ( + 1) :
Because U(H; q)  U^(H; q) and U(L; q)  U^(L; q) for every q  = ( + 1) ; there can-
not exist any value q^ strictly smaller than the value q that solves the indi¤erence equation
(3), and such that the indi¤erence condition U^(H; q^) = U^(L; q^) holds. We have concluded
that the equilibrium derived in the rst part of the proof minimizes the militarization
probability q among all equilibria of the militarization and negotiation game.
For q in the relevant range [= ( + 2) ; = ( + 1)); this equilibriums strategies at the
Nash demand stage conform with the equilibrium of Lemma 1. Hence this equilibrium also
minimizes the probability of conict, given the militarization strategy q: As a result, it also
maximizes playerswelfare W among all equilibria of the militarization and negotiation
game.
Proof of Lemma 3. We rst reformulate the un-mediated communication problem by
substituting the Nash demand game, with the following, simpler, model. Given messages
m = (mA;mB) ; and the outcome of the public randomization device, nature selects a split
proposal x; and the players simultaneously choose whether to agree to the pie division
(x; 1  x) or not.
Every outcome of this simpler communication model is also an equilibrium of the Nash
demand game with un-mediated peace talks. Suppose, in fact, that the players agree to the
split division (x; 1  x) in this simpler communication model. Then, they can achieve the
outcome (x; 1  x) in the Nash demand game, by making demands xA = x and xB = 1 x:
Every separating equilibrium of the Nash demand game with un-mediated peace talks is
also an equilibrium of the simpler communication model. In a separating equilibrium, each
players strength is common knowledge in the Nash demand stage of the game. Hence, in
equilibrium, the players know each others demands. If a player i demands x; his opponents
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js best response is either to demand 1 x and secure peace, or to trigger war with a higher
demand. Player js choice of whether to trigger war or make the demand 1   x follows
exactly the same calculation that j would make in the simpler model in which j only
needs to either agree to the split (x; 1  x) or not. We have shown that every separating
equilibrium of our Nash demand game with un-mediated peace talks is also an equilibrium
of the simpler communication model introduced above.
The pure-strategy equilibria of this communication model can either be pooling or
separating. Of course, the former coincide with the equilibria of the Nash demand game
without peace talks. Hence, all the pure-strategy equilibria that improve the peace chance
V (q) can be determined as separating equilibria of the simpler game introduced in this
proof. These equilibria are characterized in the proof of Lemma 4 of Hörner, Morelli, and
Squintani (2015), henceforth shortened as HMS, and they are reported in the statement of
the result proved here.
We now complete the analysis of Lemma 3 to cover the case  < 1:
Dene the functions b^; p^H and p^M as follows: when q <

2+1
; p^H (q) = 0;
p^M (q) =
1 q
(+1)(1 2q) and b^ (q) = q(1 )+p(1 q)+12q > p; when q 2 [ 2+1 ;minf 1+2 ; +1g);






; p^M (q) = 1; p^H (q) =
q (1 2q)
q(+1)
; and nally when
1
+2
 q < 
+1




Lemma 3B. For any given militarization probability q; and benet/cost ratio parameter
 < 1; there exists equilibria of the negotiation game with un-mediated peace talks with at
least the same peace chance V (q) as the equilibria of the negotiation game without peace
talks. For any q < =( + 2) or 
2+1
 q < =( + 1); there also exist equilibria with pure
communication strategies that strictly increase the peace chance. Every such an equilibrium
is characterized by three parameters, b  b^; pH  p^H (q) and pM  p^M (q) ; and has the
same form as the equilibria of Lemma 3. The equilibrium that maximizes V (q) is such that
b = b^; pH = p^H (q) and pM = p^M (q) :
Proof. Following the same arguments as in proof of Lemma 3, which considered the case
  1; all the equilibria that can improve the peace chance V (q) over the equilibria of the
Nash demand game without peace talks can be determined as separating equilibria of the
game introduced in the proof of Lemma 3. These equilibria are characterized in the proof
of Lemma 4 of HMS, and they are reported in the statement of the Lemma proved here.
The result that such separating equilibria do not improve for V (q) over the equilibria of




) is shown with direct calculations, that we omit as they are not
insightful.
Proof of Proposition 1. We know from Lemma 2 that, for k 2 [k; k]; the optimal
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equilibrium of the militarization and negotiation game without peace talks is such that
the arming strategy q lies between =( + 2) and =( + 1); that strong players demand
xH = p at the negotiation stage, and weak players demand xL = 1  p: Further, players
ght only if both are strong. Weak playerspayo¤s are 1=2 when facing a weak player, and
1  p when facing a strong one.
Suppose that =( + 2)  q < =( + 1): Consider the pure communication strategy
separating equilibria of the Nash demand game with un-mediated cheap talk described in
Lemma 3. Relative to the equilibria of Lemma 2, these equilibria reduce the probability
that pairs of strong players ght each other from one to 1   pH ; where 0 < pH  pH : Of
course they cannot reduce the probability that weak players ght, and they cannot increase
the weak players payo¤, because 1  b  1  p: Hence, the equilibria of Lemma 3 increase
the payo¤ of strong players in the Nash demand game, and cannot increase the payo¤ of
weak players. Specically, the equilibria of Lemma 3 raise the payo¤ for arming to
U^(H; q) = (1  q)b+ q [=2(1  pH) + pH=2]  k; (4)
and weakly decrease the payo¤ for remaining weak to:
U^(L; q) = (1  q)=2 + q [(1  pM) (1  p)  + pM (1  b)] : (5)
Again, the equilibrium militarization strategy q solves the indi¤erence condition U(L; q) =
U(H; q); so that:
q = min

b  k   1=2
b  (1=2  =2) pH   =2 + [1  b   (1  p)] pM + (1  p)    1=2 ; 1

: (6)
This quantity decreases in pM and increases in pH ; so it is minimized setting pM = 1 and
pH = 0; so as to obtain:
q = min

b  k   1=2
1=2  =2 ; 1

;
this quantity increases in b and pH ; and it is minimized setting b = p; so as to obtain
q =    2k=(1   ); which is the arming probability of the optimal equilibrium of the
militarization and negotiation game without peace talks.
Suppose now that q < =( + 2): By Lemma 3, peace talks can only improve the peace
chance V (q) in equilibrium, by reducing the conict probability in asymmetric player pairs
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from 1 to 1  pM < 1: Hence, peace talks yield weak players the equilibrium payo¤s:
U^(L; q) = (1  q)=2 + q [(1  p)(1  pM) + pM(1  b)] < (1  q)=2 + q(1  p);
without reducing the strong playerspayo¤s U(H; q):We know from the proof of Lemma 2
that, for k 2 [k; k]; the unique value of q such that U(H; q) = (1  q)=2 + q(1  p) is such
that q 2 [=( + 2); =( + 1)]: A fortiori, there cannot exist a value of q < =( + 2) such
that U(H; q) = U^(L; q):
We now consider mixed communication strategy separating equilibria of the Nash de-
mand game with un-mediated cheap talk, if any exists.
We separately consider the cases in which strong players and weak players randomize.
It cannot be the case that both weak and strong players are indi¤erent between reporting L
or H; because the strong playersconict payo¤s are strictly larger than the weak players
payo¤s.
Suppose that strong players randomize, and reveal their strength with probability H 2
[0; 1]: Then, the following indi¤erent condition must hold:
(1  q) [(1  pM)p + pMb] + q (1  H) =2 + qH [(1  pH)=2 + pH=2]
= (1  q)maxfp; 1=2g+ q (1  H) =2 + qH [(1  pM)=2 + pM maxf=2; 1  bg] ;
where, again, the settlement proposal b is subject to the constraint: b  p: The left-hand
side is the payo¤ obtained by reporting the true strength H; and the right-hand side is the
payo¤ for reporting arming strength L: Note that, after reporting that it is weak, the strong
player is still able to reject the settlement proposals 1=2 and 1  b and ght. This is what
it does in equilibrium, because the ghting payo¤s, p and =2 are larger than 1=2 and
1  b; respectively, for   1: (This is also the reason why the strong players payo¤ is =2
against another strong player who reports to be weak, an event that obtains with probability
q (1  H) :) Thus, the strong player payo¤ in equilibrium is U(H; q) = (1  q) p+q=2 k
as in the optimal equilibrium of the game without peace talks (cf. Lemma 2). Further, the
equilibrium payo¤ of weak players is:
U^(L; q) = (1  q)=2 + q(1  H)(1  p) + qH [(1  pM)(1  p) + pM(1  b)] ;
and this quantity cannot be larger than the payo¤ of weak players in the pure commu-
nication strategy equilibria of Lemma 3, which is reported in expression (5). Hence, we
conclude that randomization by strong players cannot lead to a lower equilibrium arming
strategy q than in the pure communication strategy equilibria of Lemma 3.
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Let us turn to randomization by weak players, supposing that they report to be strong
with positive probability 1  L: Then, the following indi¤erence condition must hold:
(1  q)L=2 + (q + (1  q) (1  L)) ((1  pM)(1  p) + pM(1  b)) (7)
= (1  q)L ((1  pM)=2 + pMb) + (q + (1  q) (1  L)) ((1  pH)(1  p) + pH=2) ;
whereas, for the players to be indi¤erent between arming or not, the following condition
must hold:
(1  q)L=2 + (q + (1  q) (1  L)) ((1  pM)(1  p) + pM(1  b)) (8)
= (1  q)L ((1  pM)p + pMb) + (q + (1  q) (1  L)) ((1  pH)=2 + pH=2)  k:
Subtracting equation (7) from (8), and rearranging, we obtain the following expression that
pins down the equilibrium militarization q as an inverse function of k;
~k (q) = (1 q)L(1 pM) (p   =2)+(q + (1  q) (1  L)) (1 pH) (=2  (1  p)) : (9)
This function increases in q; as @k (q; pM ; pH ; L) =@q = L (pM   pH) (2p  1) =2 > 0:
So, we only need to show that it is the case that ~k (q)  k for q = = ( + 2) :
In fact, the equilibrium militarization strategy q (k) strictly decreases in k in the game
without peace talks (cf. Lemma 2), and is such that q (k) = = ( + 2) for k = k: Consider
then the inverse function k (q) = q 1 (q) that identies the militarization cost k such that
the equilibrium arming strategy takes the value q in the game without peace talks. Because
q (k) strictly decreases in k; the inverse function k (q) strictly decreases in q; and it is such
that k (q) = k for all q = = ( + 2) : So, if ~k (= ( + 2))  k; it follows that ~k (q)  k (q)
for any q 2 [= ( + 2) ; = ( + 1)] ; and hence it cannot be the case that there exists
= ( + 2)  q0 < q  = ( + 1) such that ~k (q0) = k (q) 2 [k; k]: And, for any q0 <
= ( + 2) such that ~k (q0) = k (q) 2 [k; k]; the mixed strategy equilibrium strictly decreases
the peace probability in emerged disputes relative to the optimal equilibrium of the game
without peace talks. In fact, the peace probability in the latter is 1  q2; and in the former
it is:
V (q0) = 1  (1  q)2 (1  L)2   2q (1  q) (L(1  pM)  (1  L))  q2 < 1  q2;
because pH = 0 and pM < 1 as a consequence of q0 < = ( + 2) :
In sum, if ~k (q)  k at q = = ( + 2) ; then the equilibrium militarization probability is
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higher in the optimal equilibrium of the game without peace talks, than in every equilibrium
of the game with un-mediated peace talks such that weak players randomize messages and
that the peace chance V (q) is larger than without peace talks.
We now prove that ~k (= ( + 2))  k: By substituting equation (7) in the expression
(9), we obtain the expression:
~k (q) =
 (2p  1) =2
1   + (2p  1)
0B@ 2bpM   2ppM + 1  2   L   2pM + 2p + qL + L
+2pM + LpM   qL   qLpM   LpM + qLpM
1CA :
Because ~k (q) increases in b; we make it as low as possible, setting b = p; and obtain:
~k (q) =
 (2p  1) =2
1   + (2p  1)
0B@ 1  2   L   2pM + 2p + qL + L + 2pM
+LpM   qL   qLpM   LpM + qLpM
1CA :
This expression decreases in pM and L; as @~k (q) =@pM /   (1  L + qL + 1) (1  ) < 0
and @~k (q) =@L /   (1  ) (1  pM) (1  q) < 0: Setting pM and L as high as possible,
pM = 1 and L = 1; we obtain ~k (q) = k; for q = = ( + 2) ; as we intended to do.
We are only left to inspect the e¤ect of un-mediated peace talks on the conict proba-
bility C and on the playerswelfare W: Because conict erupts only in strong players pairs,
and only with probability 1  pH ; it takes the simple form:
C = q2(1  pH): (10)
Recalling that q is minimized setting b = p and pM = 1; and substituting expression (6)

















that clearly increases in pH : Hence, the overall conict probability is minimized setting
pH = 0 as in the optimal equilibrium of the militarization and negotiation game without
peace talks.
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Because the welfare takes the simple form:
W = 1  C(1  )  2kq;
and the conict probability C increases in pH ; it follows that the welfare is maximized
setting pH = 0; again.
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof of this result consists in showing that the optimal
equilibrium strategies of a Myerson mediator in our Nash demand game coincide with the
optimal mediation strategies in the following simpler game. First, each player i sends a
message mi to the mediator. Then, the mediator recommends a split of the pie (x; 1  x)
as a function of the received messages (mA;mB) : The split is implemented if and only if
both players accept, and conict erupts if at least one player rejects it.
Because this simple game is a direct revelation game, the revelation principle byMyerson
(1982) implies that every equilibrium of our Nash demand game with a mediator is also an
equilibrium of this simpler game.
To prove the converse, consider any equilibrium of the simple game introduced above.
Take any message pair (mA;mB) ; suppose that the mediator recommends the split of the
pie (x; 1  x) ; and the players accept it. Then, for the same message pair (mA;mB) ; the
mediator of our model can recommend that the players demand precisely xA = x and
xB = 1  x in the Nash demand game, and the players will be willing to implement these
recommendations, thus also averting war. If instead, the mediator recommends the split
of the pie (x; 1  x) ; and one or both players reject it in the equilibrium of the simple
direct revelation game, then the mediator of our model can recommend that the players
make excessive demands (e.g., xA = xB = 1); and coordinate the players on the conict
equilibrium of the Nash demand game.
We have concluded that the optimal strategies of a mediator in our Nash demand
game coincide with the optimal strategies of a mediator in the simpler game introduced
above. These strategies are characterized in Lemma 4 of HMS, and they are reported in
the statement of Lemma 4.
Direct comparison of these strategies with the formulas of pM and pH of Lemma 3 and
3B shows that (i) for   1 and =(+2)  q < =(+1); mediation strictly improves the
peace chance V (q) relative to the optimal equilibrium (and hence to any equilibrium) of the
Nash demand game with un-mediated peace talks; that (ii) for   1 and all other values
of q; mediation yields the same peace chance V (q) as un-mediated peace talks; that (iii)
for  < 1 and either q < 
2+1








 q < 
+1
; mediation
strictly improves the peace chance V (q) relative to any equilibrium of the Nash demand
game with un-mediated peace talks, and that (iv) mediation yields the same peace chance
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V (q) as un-mediated peace talks for  < 1 and q  
+1
:
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the game of militarization and negotiation, in which
the negotiations are conducted by a mediator. Because of Lemma 4, each players expected
equilibrium payo¤s for militarizing and for remaining weak are, respectively:
U (L; q) = q [pM(1  p) + qM=2 + (1  pM   qM)(1  p)] + (1  q)=2; (11)
U (H; q) = q [qH=2 + (1  qH)=2] + (1  q) [pMp + qM=2 + (1  pM   qM)p]  k: (12)
The values of pM ; qM and qH depend on whether q < =( + 2); or =( + 2)  q 
=(+1)  for the same arguments as in Lemma 2, there cannot exist an equilibrium with
q > =( + 1); when k 2 k 2 [k; k]:
We consider the case in which q < =( + 2); rst. Substituting the values of pM ; qM






(1  q) [1  (1  )]
( + 1)(1  q)  2q +
[(1  q)  2q] [   ( + 1)(1  )]












[(1  ) + 1]:
Solving the indi¤erence condition U(L; q) = U(H; q); we obtain the value of militariza-
tion cost k which makes the players indi¤erent between arming and remaining weak, as a




(1  ) ( + 1) q(1 + q)  (1  q)
2q   ( + 1)(1  q) : (13)





(1  ) ( + 1) (1  q) 3q   (1  q) + 1
(3q    + q   1)2
/  3q   1 + (1  q):
The expression is positive for q < (   1)=( + 3) and negative for q > (   1)=( + 3);
on the range q 2 [0; =( + 2)] ; further, k (q) = (1  ) =2 at q = 0 and k (q) = k at
q = =(+2):We have thus concluded that there does not exist any equilibrium such that
q  =( + 2); for k  k:
41
Turning to the case =( + 2)  q < =( + 1); the expressions (11) and (12) take the
forms:




2q   (1  q)
( + 1)(1  q)  q

(1  p) + 1


2q   (1  q)













2q   (1  q)








2q   (1  q)









2q   (1  q)






2q   (1  q)






Solving the indi¤erence condition U(L; q) = U (H; q) ; we obtain the expression reported
in the statement of the proposition proved here:
q(k) = (1 + )
2k   (1  )
2k(2 + )  (1 + )2 (1  ) : (14)
This function strictly decreases in k; as @q(k)=@q /  2(1  )( +1); and takes the values
q(k) = ( + 1)=( + ( + 1)2) and q(k) = =( + 2) at the extreme of the interval [k; k]:
Because = ( + 1) > ( + 1)=( + ( + 1)2); we conclude that for k 2 [k; k]; there is a
unique equilibrium of the game of militarization and optimally mediated negotiation. The
equilibrium militarization strategy q takes the expression (14).
Theorem 1, proved below, states that optimal Myerson mediation strategies achieve
the same welfare as a hypothetical institution that chooses militarization strategies, col-
lects players arming strength reports, and makes settlement proposals with the objective
to maximize the playerswelfare W: Hence, optimal mediation strategies weakly improve
welfare W relative to all equilibria of the game of militarization and negotiation with un-
mediated peace talks or without communication. In fact, a possible mediators strategy is
not to mediate at all (thereby replicating all equilibria of the militarization and negotiation
game without peace talks). And by the revelation principle by Myerson (1982), the me-
diator can also reproduce all equilibria of the game of militarization and negotiation with
un-mediated peace talks (here, this is done by setting qM = 0):
We want to prove that, for k 2 [k; k]; the welfare improvement of optimal mediation
strategies is strict. By Proposition 1, we only need to compare the optimal equilibrium of
the militarization and negotiation game with mediation, with the optimal equilibrium of
the militarization and negotiation game without peace talks, reported in Lemma 2. That
these equilibria do not yield the same welfare follows from the fact that qH > 0 i.e.,
strong player pairs do not ght with probability one at the negotiation stage in the optimal
equilibrium of the game with mediation, for the relevant equilibrium militarization range
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=( + 2)  q  ( + 1)=( + ( + 1)2) < =( + 1):
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove this result, we rst show a useful Lemma that compares
the optimal equilibrium welfare of the militarization and negotiation game with mediation,
with the equilibrium welfare of the militarization and negotiation game, in which negoti-
ations are optimally settled by a Myerson arbitrator. Such an arbitrator acts analogously
to our mediator, with one key di¤erence. Once both players have individually agreed that
the dispute will be settled by the arbitrator, the international community provides the
arbitrator with the means to enforce her recommendations. This is in stark contrast with
mediators, who cannot enforce their recommendations.
Arguments identical to the ones of the proof of Lemma 4 show that, for any given arming
probability q; the optimal Myerson arbitrator strategies (b; pL; pM ; pH) coincide with the
solution of the arbitration program calculated in Lemma 1 of HMS: for q  =( + 2),
b = (1 )+1
2
; pL = 1; pM =
1 q









Lemma A below shows that the equilibrium welfare of the militarization and negotiation
game with optimal mediation and arbitration strategies is the same. This result is of
independent interest, and it reinforces the main nding of Proposition 1 of HMS (the main
result of that paper), that mediation and arbitration are equally e¤ective in maximizing
the probability of peace, taking the militarization probability q as given.
Lemma A. The equilibrium welfare in the game of militarization and optimally medi-
ated negotiations is the same as the equilibrium welfare in the game of militarization and
negotiations settled optimally by a Myerson arbitrator.
Proof of Lemma A. The equilibrium militarization strategy q when negotiations are
settled by an arbitrator is given by the indi¤erence condition:
U(L; q) = (1  q) [(1  pM)p + pMb] + q [(1  pH)=2 + pH=2] (15)
= (1  q) [(1  pL)=2 + pL=2] + q [(1  pM)(1  p) + pM(1  b)]  k = U(H; q):
Substituting the arbitration solution (pL; pM ; pH) in this indi¤erence condition, we obtain
the expression (13) for q  =(+2) and the expression (14) for =(+2)  q  =(+1);
which correspond to the inverse of the arming strategy in the optimal equilibrium of the
militarization and negotiation game with mediation.
We have concluded that the optimal equilibrium militarization probability q in the game
with a mediator and with an arbitrator are the same. Because Proposition 1 of HMS proves
that mediation and arbitration are equally e¤ective in maximizing the probability of peace,
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for any militarization probability q; we conclude that also the equilibrium welfareW of the
militarization and negotiation game with a mediator and with an arbitrator is the same.
As a consequence of the above Lemma, we can prove the Theorem simply by showing
that the optimal equilibrium welfare of the militarization and negotiation game with a
Myerson arbitrator achieves the same welfare as our hypothetical institution that includes
militarization deterrence in its objectives.
In fact, we prove a stronger result. We show that the arbitration solution achieves the
same welfare as an even more powerful hypothetical institution that not only aims to keep
militarization in check, but is also capable of enforcing its recommendations.
Letting weak and strong playersinterim expected payo¤s be, respectively,
UL = (1  q) [(1  pL)=2 + pL=2] + q [(1  pM)(1  p) + pM(1  b)] ;
UH = (1  q) [pMb+ (1  pM) p] + q [pH=2 + (1  pH) =2] ;
this hypothetical institution chooses q; b; pL; pM and pH so as to maximize the welfare
W = (1  ) + (1  q)2 pL + 2q(1  q)(pM   k) + q2(pH   2k) (16)
subject to the ex-ante obedience constraints:
q (1  q) [UH   k   UL] = 0; (17)
q[UH   k   UL]  0; (1  q) [UH   k   UL]  0
to the interim individual rationality constraints (for strong and weak players, respectively),
UH  (1  q) p + q=2; (18)
UL  (1  q) =2 + q (1  p) ;
and to the interim incentive compatibility constraints (for strong and weak players),
UH  (1  q) [(1  pL)p + pL=2] + q [(1  pM)=2 + pM(1  b)] ;
UL  (1  q) [(1  pM)=2 + pMb] + q [(1  pH)(1  p) + pH=2] : (19)
In order to prove that the optimal equilibrium of the militarization and negotiation
game with Myerson arbitration achieves the same welfare as this hypothetical institution,
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we proceed in two steps.
The rst step consists in showing that the solution (b; pL; pM ; pH ; q) of the program that
minimizes the conict probability:
C = (1  q)2 (1  pL) + 2q (1  q) (1  pM) + q2 (1  pH) (20)
subject to the ex-ante indi¤erence constraint (17), to the strong playersinterim individ-
ual rationality constraint (18), and to the weak players interim incentive compatibility
constraint (19), coincides with the solution (b; pL; pM ; pH) of the program that minimizes
the militarization probability q; together with the resulting minimal q; under the same
constraints (17-19).
A consequence of this result is that this solution (b; pL; pM ; pH ; q) solves the welfare
maximization program (16).
To prove this result, we rst solve b in the indi¤erence constraint (17), and substitute
it in the constraints (18) and (19). Rearranging, these two constraints now take the forms,
respectively
UH = k(1  q)   (1  q) (2p  1)
2
+




 (2p  1) [1  (1  q) pM   qpH ]
2
  k  0: (22)
Note now that the conict probability C expression (20) decreases in pL; that UL is inde-
pendent of pL; and that UH increases in pL: Because setting pL = 1 makes C as small as
possible without violating the constraints UH  0 and UL  0; it has to be part of the solu-
tion (b; pL; pM ; pH) of the conict probability C minimization program above. Substituting
pL = 1 in C and UH ; we thus obtain the simpler expressions:
C = 2q (1  q) (1  pM) + q2 (1  pH) ; (23)
UH = k(1  q)  1
2
 (1  q) (2p  1) + 1
2

(1  ) (1  q)2 + 2(1  q)qpM + q2pH

: (24)
Now, we observe that UL decreases in pH and pM ; and that UL =  k when pM = 1 and
pH = 1: Because V (q) increases in both pM and pH ; this concludes that the constraint
UL  0 must bind.
We now solve for pM in the constraint UL = 0 and substitute it into the expressions
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(23) and (24) of C and UH : We obtain
C = q2pH +K1 (p; ; q; k) ;
UH =  1
2
q2 (1  ) pH +K2 (p; ; q; k) ;
where the explicit formulas of K1 and K2 are inessential. Because C increases in pH and
UH decreases in pH ; in the above expressions, this concludes that the constraint UH  0
must bind.
Setting pL = 1 and solving for pM and pH in the binding constraints (21) and (22),
UL = 0 and UH = 0, and substituting the solution in the objective function C; we obtain:
C =
2 (k   p) (1  q) + 1  q
1   :
This function increases in q for k  (p   1=2) = (1  ) =2: (For k > (1  ) =2; the
problem becomes trivial as militarization is so expensive that there is an equilibrium of the
militarization and negotiation game in which the militarization probability q is zero, and
peace obtains.) Hence, the minimization of C under the constraints that UH = 0; UL = 0;
0  pM  1; 0  pH  1 is equivalent to the minimization of q subject to the constraints
that UH = 0; UL = 0; 0  pM  1; 0  pH  1 and 0  q  1:
The second step of the proof that the optimal equilibrium of militarization and ne-
gotiation game with Myerson arbitration achieves the same welfare as the hypothetical
institution that solves program (16) consists in showing that the solution (pL; pM ; pH ; q) of
the minimization of q subject to the constraints UH = 0; UL = 0; 0  pM  1; 0  pH  1
and 0  q  1 is exactly equal to the optimal equilibrium strategies of the game of milita-
rization and negotiation with Myerson arbitration, reported before Lemma A.




! +1; because  (2p  1) (2p   2k   1)  0 when k  p   1=2 =
(1   )=2: Hence, the solution (pL; pM ; pH ; q) of the minimization of q subject to the
constraints that H = 0; L = 0; 0  pM  1; 0  pH  1 and 0  q  1 must be interior,
i.e., it must be such that q 2 (0; 1):
Then, to calculate this solution (pL; pM ; pH ; q); we proceed as follows.
First, we calculate the minimal value k(q) that satises UH = 0 and UL = 0 subject to
the constraints 0  pM  1 and 0  pH  1:
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 1  q   pM (1  3q + (1  q))




( + 1) (1  ) (1  q)  q(1  q)pM   q
2
1  2q + (1  q) :
Because k(q) decreases in pM for all q < =( + 1); we want to set pM as large as possible.




1 2q+(1 q) ; which lies in [0; 1] if and only
if q  =( + 2): We note that this expression is part of the optimal Myerson arbitrator
strategies (b; pL; pM ; pH); for =( + 2)  q  =( + 1):




( + 1) (1  ) (1  q)  q
1  2q + (1  q) :
Because k0 (q) /  1
2
( + 1) (1  ) = (2q    + q   1)2 ; this expression strictly decreases
in k:




( + 1) (1  )(1  q) + q
2pH   q(1 + q)
( + 1)(1  q)  2q (25)
pM =
(1  q)2   qpH (1  2q + (1  q))
(1  q) (( + 1)(1  q)  2q) :
For q  =( + 2); the expression k(q) increases in pH : We thus set pH = 0 and obtain the
solution pM =
1 q
(+1)(1 q) 2q ; which lies in [0; 1] if and only if q  =( + 2): Again, we note
that this expression is part of the optimal Myerson arbitrator strategies (b; pL; pM ; pH); for




( + 1) (1  )(1  q)  q(1 + q)
( + 1)(1  q)  2q (26)
Because k0 (q) =  1
2
(1  ) ( + 1) (1  q) (1 + 3q   (1  q)) = (3q    + q   1)2 ; this ex-
pression strictly decreases in k:
Because the whole function k(q) strictly decreases in q on the whole range [0; =( + 1)] ;
the inverse function q(k) = k 1 (k) identies the minimal militarization probability q sub-
ject to the constraints that UH = 0; UL = 0; 0  pM  1; and 0  pH  1:
Direct calculations show that the inverse of the function q(k) reported in expression
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(13) for q  =( + 2) and in expression (14) for =( + 2)  q  =( + 1) coincides with
the function k(q) reported in expression (26).
Thus, we have shown that the solution (pL; pM ; pH ; q) of the minimization of q subject
to the constraints UH = 0; UL = 0; 0  pM  1; 0  pH  1 and 0  q  1; takes
exactly the same values as q; pL; pM ; pH as the optimal equilibrium strategies of the game
of militarization and negotiation with Myerson arbitration.
This result yields Theorem 1 because (i) the optimal arbitration strategies satisfy all the
constraints of the program (16), that calculates the optimal choice q; b; pL; pM and pH of the
welfare-maximization hypothetical institution capable of enforcing its recommendations;
(ii) the constraints that UH = 0; UL = 0; 0  pM  1; 0  pH  1 and 0  q  1
correspond to the constraints (17-19) that are weaker than the constraints of program (16);
and (iii) the solution (pL; pM ; pH ; q) of the minimization of q subject to the constraints
UH = 0; UL = 0; 0  pM  1; 0  pH  1 and 0  q  1; also maximizes welfare W under
the same constraints.
We conclude by considering the possibility that there is a positive probability  that
the players can renegotiate a peaceful agreement when the mediator quits the peace talks,
or there is a positive probability  that the mediator called to settle the dispute is not
capable to commit to quit the peace talks. The optimal equilibrium of the militarization and
negotiation game with mediation is still achieved, as long as the probabilities  and  are not
too large. In this case, the same interim expected payo¤s as in the optimal equilibrium (and
hence the same interim behavior of players and ex-ante payo¤s) are achieved if mediators
able to commit to quit peace talks modify their strategies by appropriately increasing the
probability of quitting. As a result, Theorem 1 extends.
Specically, when k 2 [k; k]; we know from Proposition 2 that the optimal equilibrium
of the militarization and negotiation game with mediation is such that conict arises only in
strong player pairs, and with probability 1  qH = 1  [2k(+2) (+1)(1 )][(+1)(1 ) 2k](+1)2(1 )[2k (1 )] ; as it
shown substituting the militarization probability expression q = (1 + ) 2k (1 )
2k(2+) (1+)2(1 )




(+1)(1 q) q : At most, the mediator able to commit can quit
with probability one, if both players report they are strong, so that the overall probability
that conict breaks out among two self-reported strong players is: (1  )  = 1   :
As long as this quantity is weakly larger than 1  qH ; or
+   [2k ( + 2)   ( + 1) (1  )] [( + 1) (1  )  2k]
( + 1)2 (1  ) [2k    (1  )] ; (27)
the optimal equilibrium of the militarization and negotiation game with mediation is still
achieved, because the mediator able to commit can compensate for the possibility of rene-
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gotiation, and the presence of mediators not capable to commit to quit. Hence, Theorem
1 extends under condition (27).
Turning to the case when k < k; an appendix not submitted for publication shows
that the optimal equilibrium of the militarization and negotiation game with mediation
follows the exact same characterization as k 2 [k; k]: Hence, condition (27) guarantees
that Theorem 1 extends also for k < k: In the case that k > k; instead, the appendix
not submitted for publication shows that the optimal equilibrium of the militarization and
negotiation game with mediation is such that conict breaks out with probability one in
strong player pairs (and with probability 1   pM > 0 in asymmetric player pairs). So,
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1 Analysis for k =2 [k; k] and/or  < 1:
We complete the analysis, by considering cost values k =2 [k; k] and benet/cost ratio values
 < 1: We introduce the notation k = (1  ) =2:
The rst result complete the characterization of the optimal equilibrium of the milita-
rization and negotiation game without peace talks, and holds regardless of the value of the
benet/cost ratio :
Lemma 2B. If the cost of arming k < k; then the equilibrium of the militarization and
negotiation game that maximizes the playerswelfare W is such that each player militarizes
with probability q (k) = max f   2k=(1  ); 1g ; strong players demand xH = p; weak
players demand xL = 1  p; and war erupts only if both players are strong.
Suppose that the cost of arming k 2 (k; k); and   4: The equilibrium of the militarization
and negotiation game that maximizes the playerswelfare W is such that each player mili-
tarizes with probability q (k) = =( + 2); strong players demand xH = k(1 + =2) + 1=2 
 (   1) (1  ) =4; weak players demand xL = 1 xH ; and war erupts only if both players
are strong. When  > 4; instead xH = 1 (1 p); and q = [( + 2) (1  )  2k] =[3(1 )]:
If the cost of arming k  k; then the equilibrium of the militarization and negotiation game
that maximizes the playerswelfare W is such that militarization does not take place, q = 0;
and peace obtains.
Proof. We consider the case k < k; rst. Recall from the proof of Lemma 2 that in this
case, there does exist any value of q that equalizes the payo¤s U(H; q) and U(L; q) asso-
ciated with the optimal equilibria of the Nash demand game (see Lemma 1). Specically,
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for any q < =( + 1); it is the case that U(H; q) > U(L; q); whereas for q  = ( + 1) ;
U(H; q) = 1=2  k < 1=2 = U(L; q): We also know from the proof of Lemma 2 that there
cannot exist any equilibrium of the Nash demand game with payo¤s U^(H; q) < U(H; q) or
with U^(L; q) > U(L; q) for any q: Hence, there cannot exist any equilibrium of the game of
militarization and conict with arming strategy q  =( +1): The optimal equilibrium of
this game is such that q > = ( + 1) and, just like in the optimal equilibrium of Lemma
2, each player militarizes with probability q (k) = maxf   2k=(1   ); 1g strong players
demand xH = p; weak players demand xL = 1  p; and war erupts if only if both players
are strong. This payo¤s for militarizing and remaining weak in this equilibrium are, respec-
tively, U^(H; q) = p(1 q(k))+q(k)=2 k and U^(L; q) = (1 q(k))=2+q(k)(1 p): Because
q (k) > = ( + 1) ; they are smaller than the payo¤s U(H; q) and U(L; q) associated with
the optimal equilibria of the Nash demand game.
Second, we consider the case k 2 (k; k): Consider again the payo¤s U(H; q) and U(L; q)
associated with the equilibria of Lemma 1. When q < = ( + 2) ; solving the indi¤erence




(1  ) (q + )
which strictly increases in q; and is such that k (0) = (1  ) =2 = k: This implies that
U(H; q) > U(L; q) for q < = ( + 2) : Because there cannot exist any equilibrium of the
Nash demand game with payo¤s U^(H; q) < U(H; q) or with U^(L; q) > U(L; q); for any q;
there cannot exist any equilibrium of the game of militarization and conict with arming
strategy q < = ( + 2) :
When k > k and q  = ( + 2) ; direct inspection of payo¤s expressions (1) and (2)
shows that U(L; q) > U(H; q): By Lemma 2, by setting the strong players equilibrium
demands x^H above xH = p; it is possible to increase the payo¤s U^(H; q) and reduce
U^(L; q) without a¤ecting the peace probability in the Nash demand game, as long as
x^H  1  (1  p) : So, the optimal equilibrium of the game of militarization and conict is
such that U^(H; q) = x^H(1 q)+q=2 k = (1 q)=2+q(1 p) = U^(L; q) for q = = ( + 2) :
Thus, the optimal strong playersdemands are x^H = k(1+=2)+1=2  (   1) (1  ) =4:
This expression increases in k and it is smaller than 1  (1  p)  for   4: For  > 4; the
optimal strong playersdemands are x^H = 1   (1  p) ; so that the arming probability q
solves U^(H; q) = (1  (1  p) ) (1  q) + q=2  k = (1  q)=2 + q(1  p) = U^(L; q); and
takes the formula reported in the Proposition we are proving.
Finally, suppose that k  k: In this case, there is an equilibrium of the game of milita-
rization and conict in which militarization does not take place, q = 0; and peace obtains.
In fact, the payo¤s for militarizing and remaining weak are, respectively, U(H; q) = p  k
2
and U(L; q) = 1=2; and U(H; q) = p k  U(L; q) = 1=2; for k  p 1=2 = (1  ) =2 =
k:
The second result completes the analysis of Proposition 1 to the cases in which k =2 [k; k]
and/or  < 1: We use the denition k = (1  ) 2= (2 + 1) :
Proposition 1B. Suppose that k < k (regardless of the value of ); or that  < 1 and
k 2 [k; k]: Then, every equilibrium selection of the negotiation game with un-mediated
peace talks that uniformly strictly increases the peace probability V (q) in emerged disputes
leads to a strict increase of equilibrium militarization probability q and the overall conict
probability C; and to a strict decrease of ex-ante welfare W; in the associated equilibrium
of the whole game of militarization and negotiation.
Suppose that  < 1 and k 2 (k; k]: Then, there exists equilibrium selections of the negotia-
tion game with un-mediated peace talks that uniformly increase the peace probability V (q)
in emerged disputes, that lead to the existence of an equilibrium of the whole game of mili-
tarization and negotiation, in which the militarization probability q and the overall conict
probability C are strictly larger than in the optimal equilibrium of the game of militarization
and negotiation without peace talks, and the welfare W is strictly smaller.
Suppose that k 2 (k; k) (regardless of the value of ): Then, there exists equilibria of
the negotiation game with un-mediated peace talks that increase the peace probability in
emerged disputes and the ex-ante welfare W in the associated equilibrium of the whole
game of militarization and negotiation.
Proof. Step 1. Suppose that  < 1 and k 2 k; k :
The analysis is analogous to the case for k 2 [k; k] and   1 studied in Proposition 1.
For = ( + 2)  q < = ( + 1) ; let us compare again the optimal equilibrium of
the militarization and negotiation game without peace talks of Lemma 2, with the pure
communication strategy separating equilibria of the Nash game with un-mediated cheap
talk described in Lemma 3B. Again, we obtain that (i) the former increase the payo¤ of
strong players in the Nash demand game, and cannot increase the payo¤ of weak players,
that (ii) the equilibrium militarization strategy q solves the indi¤erence condition U(L; q) =
U(H; q) and is expressed by (6), so that it is minimized setting pM = 1; pH = 0; and b = p:
The only di¤erence with respect to the case of Proposition 1, is that for q 2 [=( +
2); = (2 + 1)); there does not exist any separating equilibria of the Nash game with un-
mediated cheap talk that strictly improves V (q) relative to the equilibrium of Lemma 2.
For any militarization cost k 2 (k; k]; the arming strategy q of the optimal equilibrium
of the militarization and negotiation game without peace talks is such that q 2 [=( +
2); = (2 + 1)): Hence, in this case there does not exist any equilibrium selection of the
negotiation game with un-mediated peace talks that uniformly strictly increases the peace
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probability V (q) in emerged disputes. Nevertheless, equilibrium selections that increases
the peace probability V (q) on the range q 2 [= (2 + 1) ;  ( + 1)) su¢ ciently leads to the
existence of arming probability q 2 [= (2 + 1) ;  ( + 1)) such that U(L; q) = U(H; q):
As in the proof of Proposition 1, we then consider the range q < =( + 2): By Lemma
3B, again, peace talks yield weak playersthe payo¤s U^(L; q) < (1  q)=2+ q(1 p): Here,
they necessarily raise the strong playerspayo¤s U^(H; q) above U(H; q) because b  b^ > p:
The argument of the proof of Proposition 1 that there cannot exist a value of q < =(+2)
such that U^(H; q) = U^(L; q) holds a fortiori.




every pure communication strategy equilibrium selection of the negotiation game with
un-mediated peace talks that uniformly strictly increases the peace probability V (q) in
emerged disputes leads to a strict increase of equilibriummilitarization probability q and the
overall conict probability C; and to a strict decrease of ex-ante welfareW; in the associated
equilibrium of the whole game of militarization and negotiation. The argument that this
result covers also equilibrium selections with possibly mixed communication strategies (if
any exists) is the same as in the proof of Proposition 1.
The second result is that we have proved is that, for any  < 1 and k 2 (k; k], there
exists equilibrium selections of the negotiation game with un-mediated peace talks that
uniformly increase the peace probability V (q) in emerged disputes, that lead to a strict
increase of the equilibrium militarization probability q and the overall conict probability
C; and that lead to a strict increase of ex-ante welfare W in the associated equilibrium of
the whole game of militarization and negotiation.
Step 2: The analysis for case k < k and   1 is identical to the case for k 2 [k; k] and
  1 studied in Proposition 1.
Step 3: The analysis for case k < k and  < 1 is identical to the case for k 2 [k; k] and
 < 1 studied in the Step 1 of this proof.
Step 4: Suppose that the cost of arming k 2 (k; k); regardless of :
Restricting attention to q 2 [=( + 2); =( + 1)); un-mediated peace talks reduce the
probability of war among strong players to 1 pH ; and increase the payo¤s of strong players
to U^(H; q) = x^H(1  q) + q[pH=2 + (1  pH)=2]  k; without changing the payo¤s of weak
players U(L; q): For   4; the arming probability q = =(+2) is at the lower bound of the
admissible range. Increasing pH above zero, the indi¤erence condition U^(H; q) = U(L; q)
is still met at q = =( + 2) by appropriately decreasing x^H 2 [p; 1  (1  p)]: Thus un-
mediated peace talks increase the peace probability in emerged disputes, without increasing
the militarization probability, and hence lead to a strict increase of ex-ante welfare W in
the associated equilibrium of the whole game of militarization and negotiation. For  > 4;
this argument holds a fortiori, because when pM = 0; it is the case that q > =( + 2)
and x^H = 1   (1   p): Hence, by increasing pH above zero, the indi¤erence condition
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U^(H; q) = U(L; q) is still met appropriately decreasing q; and holding x^H = 1   (1   p)
xed.
The nal result completes the analysis of Proposition 2 to the cases in which k =2 [k; k]
and/or  < 1:
For any given militarization strategy q; the optimal equilibrium of the negotiation game
with Myerson mediation is characterized as follows. Each player truthfully reveals its
strength to the mediator. Strong player pairs coordinate on the peaceful demands (1=2; 1=2)
with probability qH ; and ght with probability 1  qH ; asymmetric pairs (H;L) coordinate
on the peaceful demands (p; 1  p) with probability pM ; on the demands (1=2; 1=2) with
probability qM ; and ght with probability 1  pM   qM  the case for (L;H) is symmetric;
and weak player pairs do not ght and achieve the payo¤s (1=2; 1=2) in expectation. When
q  =( + 2), qH = qM = 0; and 0 < pM < pM < 1; when =( + 2)  q < =( + 1),
pM + qM = 1; 0 < pH < qH < 1 and qM 2 (0; 1) ; and when q  =( + 1); qM = qH = 1:40
Whenever  < 1 and/or q  =( + 2); as long as q < =( + 1); mediation strictly
increases the peace chance V (q) relative to any equilibrium of the negotiation game with
un-mediated peace talks. For all values of q and ; mediation weakly increases the chance
of peace V (q) :
Proposition 2B. The optimal equilibrium of the militarization and negotiation game with
Myerson mediation is such that the equilibrium militarization probability q (k) is strictly
decreasing and continuous in k; and weak player pairs do not ght and achieve the payo¤s
(1=2; 1=2) in expectation.
For k 2 [0; k]; the arming probability is:
q(k) = (1 + )
2k   (1  )
2k(2 + )  (1 + )2 (1  ) ;
with q (0) = =( + 1); and q(k) = ( + 1)=( + ( + 1)2); and q(k) = =( + 2):
Strong player pairs coordinate on the peaceful demands (1=2; 1=2) with probability qH ;
and ght with probability 1   qH ; asymmetric pairs (H;L) peacefully coordinate on (p;
1   p) with probability pM ; on (1=2; 1=2) with probability qM ; and ght with probability
1 pM qM  the case for (L;H) is symmetric. Mediation strictly reduces the militarization
probability q and the conict probability C; and strictly improves the welfare W with respect
40The precise formulas are as follows: when q  =( + 2), pM = 1 q(+1)(1 q) 2q ; when =( + 2)  q <










to any equilibrium of the game of militarization and conict with un-mediated peace talks,
or without communication.










(K   1) [8K + [4 + ( + 1)2] (K   1)]; for k 2 (k; k]; (28)
with lim
k!k+ q(K(k)) = =( + 2) and q(K(
k)) = 0: Strong player pairs ght with prob-
ability one, whereas asymmetric pairs (H;L) peacefully coordinate on (p; 1   p) with
probability pM ; and ght with probability 1   pM  the case for (L;H) is symmetric. For
  1; mediation yields exactly the same outcome (and hence the same militarization prob-
ability q; conict probability and welfare W ) as the optimal equilibrium of the game with
un-mediated peace talks. For  < 1; mediation strictly reduces the militarization probabil-
ity q and the conict probability C; and strictly improves the welfare W with respect to
any equilibrium of the game of militarization and conict with un-mediated peace talks, or
without communication.
Proof. Recovering the analysis of Proposition 2 for the case in which q < =( + 2);
the militarization cost value k(q) which makes the players indi¤erent between arming and
remaining weak in the militarization and negotiation game with mediation is reported in
expression (13). This function k(q) strictly increases in q for q < ( 1)=(+3) and strictly
decreases in q for q > (   1)=( + 3); on the range q 2 [0; =( + 2)); and it is such that
k(0) = k and k(=( + 2)) = k:
We thus conclude that (k; k]; there exists a unique equilibrium arming probability q (k) ;
strictly decreasing in k and such that q(k)! =(+2) for k # k and q(k) = 0: The inverse
q(k) = k 1(k) of expression (13) in the range [(   1)=( + 3); =( + 2)) yields expression
(28)
We now show that this is also the expression for the arming strategy q in the optimal
equilibrium of militarization and negotiation game with un-mediated peace talks, under
the constraint that q < =( + 2):
We rst note that, in that game, the maximum peace probability in asymmetric player
pairs is pM =
1 q
(+1)(1 q) 2q : Supposing that the optimal peace probability pM reaches the
upper bound pM ; the militarization indi¤erence condition takes the form
U(H; q) = p(1  q) + q=2  k
= U^(L; q) = (1  q)=2 + q ((1  p)(1  pM) + pM(1  p)) :
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q    + q + q2 1  
3q    + q   1 :
This function is such that k(0) = k; k(q) = k for q = =( + 2); k0(q) > 0 for q <
(   1) =( + 3) and k0(q) < 0 for q > (   1) =( + 3): Because equating k(q) = k yields
also the solution q = ( 1)=(+1); we conclude that the equilibrium arming probability q
strictly decreases in k; and is such that q(k) = =( + 2) and q(k) = (   1) =( + 1): This
solution is admissible, hence the optimal peace probability in asymmetric dyads pM reaches
the upper bound pM : Inverting the expression k(q); we obtain expression (28), again.
Because mediation can at least reproduce all the outcomes of un-mediated peace talks
in the Nash demand game, we reach the following conclusions: (i) the optimal equilibrium
of the whole game of militarization and negotiation with un-mediated peace talks is such
that the arming strategy q is smaller than than =( +2) and satises expression (28), (ii)
for   1; this equilibrium achieves the same outcome as the optimal equilibrium of the
militarization and negotiation game with mediation, and (iii) for  < 1; this equilibrium
strictly reduces the militarization probability q and the conict probability C; and strictly
improves the welfare W with respect to any equilibrium of the game of militarization and
conict with un-mediated peace talks, or without communication.
Turning to the case in which =( + 2)  q < =( + 1); we again recover the
analysis of Proposition 2, and see that the arming probability of the optimal equilibrium
of the militarization and negotiation game with a Myerson mediator satises expression
(14). This function strictly decreases in k; and takes the values q (0) = =( + 1); and
q(k) = ( + 1)=( + ( + 1)2): Simply extending the same arguments in the proof of
Proposition 2, we conclude that (i) for k 2 [0; k]; the optimal equilibrium of the game
of militarization and negotiation with mediation is such that the militarization strategy q
takes the expression (14), and (ii) this equilibrium strictly reduces the militarization prob-
ability q and the conict probability C; and strictly improves the welfare W with respect
to any equilibrium of the game of militarization and conict with un-mediated peace talks,
or without communication.
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2 Generalization of the Conict Model
We generalize our model of conict to allow for continuous investment levels, using the
context success functions introduced by Tullock (1980) and axiomatized by Skaperdas
(1996). Suppose that each player i = A;B can acquire military strength i  0 at cost
c() = h; with h  1: Given A and B; player A wins the conict with probability






B ); with m  1 and p (0; 0) = 1=2: We maintain the assumptions
of the simpler model presented in Section 3, that the militarization levels A and B are
not observable, and that the size of the pie shrinks from one to  in case of conict.
Proceeding as in Section 3, we begin by considering the militarization and bargaining
game without peace talks, in which bargaining is modelled as a Nash demand game. We
rst note that, again, there cannot be any symmetric equilibrium in which player do not
militarize. Suppose to the contrary that A = B = 0 were an equilibrium. Then, the
players would expect to win a conict with equal probability, and conict would be averted
with the demands xA = xB = 1=2: But either player i would know that with any i > 0;
it would win a conict with probability one. So, there is a su¢ ciently small militarization
level i > 0; such that choosing i and demanding xi > 1=2 thus triggering conict is a
protable deviation for player i:
Second, we observe that there cannot be any equilibrium in which A = B > 0 and
players do not ght with positive probability. If that were the case, in fact, either player
i would have as a protable deviation acquiring military strength i = 0: Because for
A = B; each players winning probability is 1=2 in case of conict, and there are no
mixed strategy equilibria in the perfect information Nash demand game, it follows that
all equilibria with pure militarization strategies must be such that conict breaks out with
probability one. The optimal equilibrium of the militarization and bargaining game without
peace talks is therefore with mixed militarization strategies.
There is an equilibrium in which players randomize between not militarizing (i.e., play-
ing  = 0) and choosing a single positive militarization level  > 0: Letting q be the
probability that they choose  = ; p = 1; and k = h; this equilibrium recovers the
equilibrium of the simpler model presented in Section 3. The condition pinning down 
is that it is the optimal choice of  in case of war against a player randomizing between
 = 0 and  = : Each player is demand xi may depend on is militarization strength
i 2 f0; g; so that whether the players ght or not depends on their strengths.
As in the analysis of Section 3 (cf. Proposition 1), we henceforth restrict attention to
the case in which war breaks out only among militarized players, in the optimal equilibrium
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m  + (1  q)    h: (29)







2   hh 1 = 0:















=  2  m3 4hh2+mq   4hh
=  2  m3 4hh2 < 0:
The indi¤erence condition between  =  and  = 0 is:
q=2 + (1  q)    h = q (1  ) + (1  q) =2: (31)
Solving these two equations simultaneously gives the unique equilibrium militarization level




2(h(1  ) +m) ; q =
2h(2   1)
2h(1  ) +m:
We now prove that this is the optimal equilibrium of the militarization and bargaining game
without peace talks. First, note that cannot exist any equilibrium in which the support of
the mixed militarization strategy includes militarization level  > 0 for which conict does
not break out in equilibrium. In fact, a player i who is supposed to play  would nd it
a protable deviation to not militarize and save the militarization costs. As a result, the
optimal equilibrium militarization strategy must include an atom at  = 0:
Further, there cannot exist equilibria of the militarization and bargaining game without
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peace talks in which the support of the mixed militarization strategy includes more than
one element  > 0: Suppose by contradiction that players randomize among  = 0;  = 1
and  = 2: Then, it would need to be the case that:












 + (1  q1   q2)    h:










































2 + q2mm2 m1 + m2 2 = hh m2 ;
which entails 1 = 2: The same argument holds for any the mixed militarization strategy
that includes more than one element  > 0:
Let us turn to un-mediated peace talks. As in Section 3, we are considering the case
in which the optimal equilibrium of the game without peace talks is such that there is no
conict when at least one player plays  = 0: Thus, un-mediated peace talks can improve
the chance of peace only by reducing the probability that war breaks out among militarized








m  + pH=2

+ (1  q)    h;
whereas the indi¤erence condition (31) between  =  and  = 0 takes the form:
q ((1  pH)=2 + pH=2) + (1  q)    h = q (1  ) + (1  q) =2:
Taking the rst order condition, imposing symmetry,  = ; and simplifying, we obtain:
4
h
h = mq(1  pH): (32)
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Under this condition, again, the second order condition is satised for  = :




2(h(1  ) +m) ; q =
1
1  pH
2h (2   1)
(2h(1  ) +m) :
As in the simpler model of Section 3, the militarization probability q increases in pH :
Further, the equilibriummilitarization level  is constant. The overall probability of conict
is















increasing in pH : Analogous manipulations imply that the welfareW = C (1  )+1 2q2
decreases in pH :
We have recovered all the results of Section 3 within our generalized with continuous
investment levels and context success functions. Every equilibrium of the negotiation game
with un-mediated peace talks that improves the peace chance given militarization, increases
militarization and conict in the whole militarization and negotiation game.
We now turn to show that there exists mediation mechanisms that yield lower milita-
rization and conict probabilities, and improves welfare, relative to both un-mediated peace
talks, and to militarization and negotiation without peace talks.
As in the simpler model of Section 4, we restrict attention to the following mediation
mechanisms. Each player i truthfully reveals its strength i = 0 or i =  > 0 to the
mediator. Militarized player pairs coordinate on the peaceful demands (1=2; 1=2) with some
probability qH and ght with probability 1   qH : When A = 0 and B = ; the players
coordinate on the peaceful demands (p; 1   p) with probability pM ; on the demands
(1=2; 1=2) with probability qM ; and ght with probability 1  pM   qM  the case in which
A =
 and B = 0 is symmetric. Non-militarized player pairs do not ght and achieve
the payo¤s (1=2; 1=2) in expectation.








m  + qH=2

+ (1  q) ((1  qM) + qM=2)  h;
rst-order condition and symmetry give:
4
h
h = mq(1  qH): (33)
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The indi¤erence condition between investing  =  and  = 0 is, now:
q ((1  qH)=2 + qH=2) + (1  q) ((1  qM) + qM=2)  h
= q ((1  qM)(1  ) + qM=2) + (1  q) =2:
Solving this, together with condition (33) yields
 = h
s
(1  qM) m (2   1)





In any mediation mechanism that improves the peace chance given militarization, relative
to the game without peace talks, or with un-mediated peace talks, it is the case that qM > 0:
Whenever this is the case, the direct comparison of the formulas for the strong playerslevel
of militarization  shows that mediation decreases  relative to the game without peace
talks and the game with un-mediated peace talks.
In order to show the same result for the probability of militarization q; it is enough
establish that 1 qM
1 qH < 1; or that qM > qH ; as in the analysis of Section 4. As it was the case
there, every mediation mechanism is subject to interim incentive compatibility and ex-post
individual rationality constraints. To be e¤ective here, a mediation mechanism needs also
to take into account the possibility that a player militarizes at a level  >  and then
rejects a mediations recommendation. This double-deviationmatters only in the case
that the player is recommended the equal split (1=2; 1=2) : To deter this double deviation,






q  qH + (1  q) qM + 
(1  q) qM
q  qH + (1  q) qM ; (34)
for all  > 0: Writing R = =; it is still the case that qM  qH under this constraint, as
long as Rm + 1  2q
1 2+2q ; and this is always true because R  0: The constraint (34) is
stronger than the ex-post individual rationality constraint of the militarized player:
1=2  q  qH
q  qH + (1  q) qM =2 +
(1  q) qM
q  qH + (1  q) qM :
So, it is the case that qM  qH for every mediation mechanism that satises constraint (34)
and the interim incentive compatibility constraint of the non-militarized player:
q ((1  qM)(1  ) + qM=2) + (1  q) =2  q  qH=2 + (1  q) ((1  qM) + qM=2):
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Every such a mediation mechanism decreases the militarization probability q relative to the
militarization and negotiation game without peace talks and to the game with un-mediated
peace talks. It also decreases the conict probability:
















and hence improves the welfare W = C (1  ) + 1  2q2:
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Evidence on Commitment
One of the main assumptions of our model is the mediators commitment to lead to a
conict escalation if this is prescribed by the optimal solution. In the real world, this
translates into the mediators commitment to quit and terminate the mediation, at least
with some probability. In this section we provide two types of evidence that mediators in
the real world are capable of keeping this commitment, and even that players prefer having
a mediator with a credible reputation of being able to keep this commitment. The rst
type of evidence is from a data set that has settlement attempts as units of observation,
namely the Issue Correlates of War dataset (ICOW), by Hensel et al (2008). The second
type of evidence will be from an illustrative case study.
In fact, mediators often make clear to the players under which circumstances they will
quit. Such contingent plans of action often include deadlines. According to Avi Gil, one of
the key architects of the Oslo peace process, A deadline is a great but risky tool. Great
because without a deadline its di¢ cult to end negotiations. [The parties] tend to play
more and more, because they have time. Risky because if you do not meet the deadline,
either the process breaks down, or deadlines lose their meaning(Watkins, 1998). Among
the many cases in which this technique was used, see for instance Curran and Sebenius
(2003)s account of how a deadline was employed by former Senator George Mitchell in the
Northern Ireland negotiations. Committing to such deadlines might be somewhat easier for
professional mediators whose reputation is at stake, but they have been also used both by
uno¢ cial and o¢ cial individuals, including Pope John Paul II and former U.S. President
Jimmy Carter.41 Meanwhile, institutions like the United Nations increasingly set time
41Bebchik (2002) describes how Clinton and Ross attempted to impress upon Arafat the urgency of
accepting the proposal being o¤ered for a nal settlement, calling it a damn good deal that would not
be within his grasp indenitely.
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limits to their involvement up-front (see, for instance, the U.N. General Assembly report,
2000).
Evidence from settlement attempts data
The ICOW data set considers each settlement attempt as a distinct observation.42 The key
source of variation is whether mediators resume the mediation process through a new set-
tlement attempt following failure or whether they withdraw for good. The theory assumes
the mediators commitment to withdraw from mediation, expecting that this condition is
essential to successful mediation. Mediation attempts in the presence of commitment to
quit should be expected to be more successful, and mediators with such a reputation more
sought after to serve as a mediator compared to mediators that cannot commit to quit. We
probe the ICOW data for information that is consistent with these two hypotheses.
To ascertain whether these patterns exist, we construct rough indicators of mediation
termination and di¤erentiate cases according to the circumstances under which they ter-
minated. The settlement attempt may end with 1) an agreement fully implemented; 2)
an agreement reached but not ratied by at least one party; 3) an agreement reached and
ratied but not complied with by at least one party; 4) no agreement reached and/or esca-
lation of violent hostilities.43 We say a mediator has quitif the mediator does not initiate
a new mediation attempt involving the same two primary players within at least 10 years
of the end of the mediation failure. We consider this a responsive quitif the settlement
attempt ended under any conditions 24. A non trivial proportion of failed mediation
attempts satisfy this criteria and a signicant portion of the mediators in the sample will
have quit at least once. Mediators who have established a reputation for actually following
through on commitments to withdraw from the process in response to player transgressions
should be considered more e¤ective mediators and therefore should be more likely to be
invited as a mediator in future settlement attempts.
Variable frequency Rel. Frequency (total) Rel. Frequency (failed)
quit1 38 28.4% (134 total) 41.8% (91 total)
quit2 39 29.1% (134 total) 41.5% (94 total)
42We use ICOW instead of other datasets because its level of analysis is appropriate for our purposes.
The International Crisis Bargaining dataset (ICB), Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997 and 2000) for example,
would not be useful because it collapses all settlement attempts for each crisis into one observation.
43We use two alternative denitions of agreement, leading to quit1 and quit2 variables, but they lead to
very similar results.
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Table 1 describes how frequently mediators quit in the sample of 134 mediation attempts
present in the ICOW dataset. The relative frequency of quitting in the panel varies slightly
based on the denition of quitting used, which vary by how strict the criteria are for
coding the result as a responsive quit, but overall the data suggest that approximately 30%
of the mediation attempts resulted in the mediator quitting by our denition. Of failed
mediation attempts, mediators quit responsively in approximately 42% of cases. It is clear
that mediators do quit in a signicant portion of cases in which quitting is called for.
Variable frequency Rel. Frequency (total)
Quit1 116 86.6% (134 total)
Quit2 116 86.6% (134 total)
Table 2 demonstrates that an overwhelming majority of mediators in the sample quit
the process (by our denition) at least once in their career. 116 of the 134 mediation
attempts in the data were mediated by a third party that had quit at least once previously
in the panel. This suggests mediators that demonstrate they will withdraw in response
to belligerent transgressions are those asked again to mediate crises. The imprecision of
the measurement and the limited variation does not allow us to claim that this is airtight
evidence that the mediators capability to credibly threaten to quit when appropriate is a
key factor in determining the mediator selection, but the evidence is at least consistent with
the general perception that the ability to commit we assume in our model is an important
characteristic of real world mediation.
Illustrative Case Study: Ko Annan in Kenya and Syria
When the contested December 2007 Kenyan Presidential election resulted in widespread
ethnic violence, threatening to escalate to full-scale civil war, the international community
rushed to establish peace-making e¤orts. After weeks of multiple uncoordinated mediation
attempts that failed to bring the players closer to a negotiated settlement, the African Union
appointed former UN Secretary-General KoAnnan to head the Panel of Eminent African
Personalities, a coalition of political actors to bring about a solution to the escalating
violence. The most important pillar of Annans mediation strategy was the consolidation
of the disparate mediation e¤orts and interested third parties behind a single process.
He demanded, and received, assurances that the international community back the Panels
e¤orts and refrain from pedaling alternative or competing mediation attempts. Throughout
the negotiations, Annan constantly devised signals to communicate the lack of alternative
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negotiating channels to the players in order to ensure their engagement with the Panels
e¤orts and proposals.
While working hard to overcome the challenges associated with bridging the bargaining
gap separating Kibaki and Odinga, Annan also made a point early on to communicate to
the players that the Panel would not remain involved indenitely. As the pace of progress
slowed, Annan reiterated that he would not be available forever and that an alternative
had to be found(Lindenmayer and Kaye, 2009). When the two sides began stalling for
time, refusing to make meaningful concessions on the political issue, Annan announced
a suspension of the talks. In an interview with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue,
Gri¢ ths (2008), Annan described the motivation for his decision:
...Look, this is getting nowhere, so Ive decided Im suspending talks. ...I had done
my duty and believed the leaders should do theirs.
Annan clearly used the suspension of the mediation process, and the threat of its termi-
nation, to coerce the parties into giving up more than they hoped at the negotiation table.
He even went so far to strengthen his signal by suggesting his successor, Cyril Ramaphosa
of South Africa. Kibaki and the PNU vehemently rejected this proposed replacement,
claiming Ramaphosa to be partial to Odingas claim. But nevertheless, the signal seems
to have been perceived as credible, as the players increased the urgency with which they
engaged with the Panels peace-making process (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009).
Annans commitment to withdraw from mediation in the event the parties refused to
abide by his negotiating plan was a calculated complement to his demand to consolidate
the international community behind one mediation process. These two tactics served the
strategy to remove the playersability to shop around for alternative mediators and conict
resolution avenues, leaving them with the option of following Annans lead or continuing a
ght neither side wanted. This strategy t the dispute well because it was clear that both
parties wanted to end the conict, but that the possibility of alternative means to attain
their political goals tempted them away from conceding too much at the negotiating table.
Despite a mixed record of success (failure in Rwanda and Bosnia; success in Kenya),
Annan was asked again to step into the mediators role as Special Envoy for the U.N and
the Arab League in Syrias escalating civil war. One of the prominent reasons cited for
his appointment was his recent success in Kenya. But, unlike in the Kenya case, in Syria
Annan faced a deeply divided international community. Though nominally unanimous in
support of Annans role and his six-point peace plan, the competing world powers almost
immediately took actions to undermine the mediation process. The U.S. and Western
allies began arming rebel forces and continued to call for Assad to step down while Russia
and China continued to prop up Assads regime. Without the international community
united behind the process, the situation deteriorated. Annan quit in response to continued
escalation of violence and both partiesviolation of the six-point plan. As such, Annan
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maintained his credibility to commit to withdraw from his role in the event players become
uncooperative.
Mediation and Arbitration Without Commitment
We here explore the conict resolution capabilities of mediators who pursue peace at all
costs in all circumstances. To provide a framework to our analysis, we focus on truthful
revelation mechanisms, as in the analysis of the mediators with commitment of Section
4. Each player i privately sends a message mi 2 fh; lg to the mediator, who then makes
a (public) recommendation. The only di¤erence with respect to Section 4 is that, here,
the mediator does not have any commitment capability: given its (equilibrium) beliefs
with respect to the types of players as a function of the received message, she makes
recommendations that induces beliefs which leads to the equilibrium that maximizes the
chance of peace.
We argue that such mediators are ine¤ective. Specically, we rst show that there
do not exist equilibria in which the players reports their types truthfully and agree to
the mediators recommendations. Hence, mediators who seek peace in all circumstances
cannot improve upon un-mediated communication by means of standard truthful revelation
mechanisms. This result follows from Theorem 2 by Fey and Ramsay (2009), but because
the setting is slightly di¤erent, we present a proof.
The rst step is to note that if there were an equilibrium, it would be one in which
peace is achieved with probability one. In fact, because the players would truthfully reveal
their types, the mediator can achieve peace with probability one by making the proposals
(p; 1  ) after reports (h; l) ; (1  ; p) after reports (l; h) ; and (1=2; 1=2) otherwise.
Because the equilibrium achieves peace with probability one, the high-types incentive






maxfb;Pr[ljb; l]p + Pr[hjb; l]=2gdF (bjl); (35)






maxfb;Pr[ljb; h]=2 + Pr[hjb; h](1  p)gdF (bjh): (36)
These two constraints are stronger than the following high-type and low-type incentive
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bdF (bjl)  B  1=2:
Let us turn to the ex post participation constraint for the high type. For any b 2 (0; 1)
such that Pr[b; h] > 0; this constraint is:
b  Pr[ljb; h]p + Pr[hjb; h]=2; (37)
Integrating this constraint, we obtain:






(Pr[ljb; h]p + Pr[hjb; h]=2)dF (bjh);











= Pr[ljh]p + Pr[hjh]=2
= q=2 + (1  q) p
which contradicts
q=2 + (1  q) p > 1=2; i.e.,  < :
We have shown that there do not exist equilibria in which the players reports their types
truthfully and agree to the mediators recommendations. Hence, mediators who seek peace
in all circumstances cannot improve upon un-mediated communication by means of stan-
dard truthful revelation mechanisms.
We now turn to consider arbitration without commitment. For comparability with
mediation without commitment, we set the analysis in a revelation game. The players
choose whether to participate and then report their types to the arbitrator, who imposes
peaceful splits. It is easy to show that there cannot exist any equilibrium in which the
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players agree to participate and play any strategy (including mixed strategies) at the report
stage of the game.
In fact, arbitration without commitment establishes peaceful splits (b; 1   b) for any
pair of messages (m1;m2); according to the symmetric distribution F (b; 1  bjm1;m2): Let
F (bjm) be the distribution of either player is split b; given is message. In equilibrium,
letting t be the mixed strategy of a player of either type t; and any message m 2 Supp(t)










bdF (bjm) = R 1
0
bdF (bjm0)  1=2 for all m and m0 in Supp(t): But
then, the interim participation constraint of strong players fails, because, again
q=2 + (1  q) p > 1=2; when  < :
Hence, the nding of Proposition 1 is conrmed for the case of third party intervention
without commitment. The arbitrator is no more e¤ective than the mediator, even in
absence of commitment.
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